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Abstract
This article analyses the increasing use of UK partnerships for criminal purposes, 
often in other jurisdictions, and argues that the regulatory responses are inadequate, 
and must be supplemented by a comprehensive ethical framework. I first argue that 
partnerships offer substantial benefits for a variety of businesses, but that they also 
have vulnerabilities which have led to their misuse and even abuse through criminal 
activities, which I also discuss. I then analyse the deficiencies of the regulatory 
measures designed to tackle the abuses, including requirements to disclose participant 
identity and accounts, and anti-money laundering and tax evasion measures. Finally, 
I evaluate the use of a supplementary ethical framework to reduce the abuses, 
and examine how such a framework could be created. My analysis provides an 
understanding of the causes and consequences of partnership abuses and of how 
they can be overcome. This advances the ongoing debate in the UK over the abuse 
of partnerships and the wider issue of business transparency, and has implications 
for the many other jurisdictions in which UK partnerships operate and in which the 
abuses take place, as well as for jurisdictions which have similar partnership vehicles 
to those in the UK.
Keywords
General partnerships, limited partnerships, LLPs, money laundering, tax evasion, tax 
avoidance, regulation, ethics, transparency, accounts
1. Introduction
The misuse of shell companies and – often connected – of tax havens has been rec-
ognised and analysed by journalists and academics across the globe.1 yet the misuse, 
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1 For example, Emile van der Does de Willebois and others, The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt 
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often amounting to abuse, of partnership vehicles (including limited liability partner-
ships (LLPs)) in the UK, has historically attracted much less attention. however, it 
has now come under the spotlight through a joint Transparency International UK 
(TI-UK)/belli¿ngcat report2 and widespread media coverage3 of the use of UK part-
nerships, in particular Scottish limited partnerships (SLPs), to facilitate illegal activ-
ities including money laundering (ML) and tax evasion. These indicate that 
partnerships now form their own ecosystem of financial crime and have prompted a 
consultation by the UK’s Department of Business, Enterprise and Industrial Strategy 
(BEIS) on limited partnerships (LPs)4 and influenced another on registration and 
transparency.5
This article addresses this gap in the legal literature in at least three ways. First, it 
analyses the nature of the problem and argues that current models of regulation to 
combat the abuse of partnerships fail to balance the importance of providing to busi-
nesses the distinctive and valuable features of partnerships, with the need to ade-
quately protect both third parties who deal with UK partnerships and the wider 
domestic and international community who may be victims of unlawful or undesir-
able behaviour facilitated by their use. Second and third, it proposes solutions in order 
to restore the balance: not only must regulation be improved in a number of key 
respects, but a comprehensive ethical framework must be implemented both to close 
loopholes in and improve compliance with regulation, and to raise standards above 
the current regulatory minimum.6 This twin track approach to solving the problem of 
abuse should be viewed as reflecting Fuller’s arguments about the separate moralities 
of duty and aspiration, with duty underlying basic levels of regulation to ensure an 
StAR 2011), James S henry, The Price of Offshore Revisited (Tax Justice Network 2012), Nicholas 
Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men who Stole the World (London; Vintage 2012) and 
Tackling Tax Havens 56(3) Finance & Development 6 (2019), Michael G Findley, Daniel L Nielson 
and JC Sharman, Global Shell Games: Experiments in Transnational Relations, Crime and Terrorism, 
31-42 (Cambridge; CUP 2014).
2 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat, Offshore in the UK: Analysing the use of Scottish Limited Partnerships in 
Corruption and Money Laundering, 20 (2017).
3 For example, David Leask and Richard Smith, Scam Financial Gambling Sites Are Fronted by 
Scots Shell Firms (Glasgow, The herald, 27 october 2016), Caelainn Barr, The Scottish Firms That Let 
Money Flow from Azerbaijan to the UK (London, The Guardian, 4 September 2017), Simon Maybe and 
Tim Whewell, Potters Bar, Ukraine’s Stolen Billions and the Eurovision Connection (BBC, 6 February 
2018) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42950097>. 
4 BEIS, Review of Limited Partnership Law – A Call for Evidence (January 2017), Limited 
Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law (30 April 2018) and Limited Partnerships: Reform 
of Limited Partnership Law – The Government Response to the Consultation (December 2018). 
5 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation on Options to Enhance the 
Role of Companies House and Increase the Transparency of UK Corporate Entities, para. 8 (May 
2019) and Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Government Response to the Consultation 
on Options to Enhance the Role of Companies House and Increase the Transparency of UK Corporate 
Entities (September 2020).
6 William Blair and Cara Barbiani, Ethics and Standards in Financial Regulation in Costanza A 
Russo, Rosa M Lastra and William Blair (eds), Research Handbook on Law and Ethics in Banking and 
Finance, 26 (Cheltenham; Elgar 2019).
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ordered society, and aspiration underlying an ethical framework through which indi-
viduals realise their best selves.7 The article also argues that although end users are 
less likely than professionals and other trust and company service providers (TCSPs) 
to be amenable to these strategies, TCSPs are gatekeepers for partnership formation 
and operation and can therefore prevent end users from accessing partnerships.
The gap in the literature is also being addressed in other respects which intersect 
with many of the issues considered in this article. Specifically, Jonathan hardman 
argues that Scottish partnerships derive their unique advantages not from statute but 
from private ordering, and therefore it is not necessary for government agencies to 
actively intervene to deprive wrongdoers of these advantages; rather they fall away 
naturally as a result of the wrongdoing and can be challenged accordingly.8 
This article starts by evaluating the rationales for the partnership vehicle and the 
legal features which respond to these but which also make it vulnerable to abuse. It 
then analyses the resulting abuses, before examining the solutions: first, the regula-
tory framework and proposals for its reform; and second, the contribution which an 
ethical framework could make to reducing the abuses. Finally, a conclusion is drawn 
as to the importance and urgency of both regulatory and ethical reforms.
2. The Rationale for the Partnership Vehicle
Partnerships have existed throughout the world since earliest times in order to promote 
commerce where the capital and work of a single person would be insufficient.9 Per-
sonal liability was an early feature,10 as was privacy,11 not least because partnerships 
existed before there were formal disclosure mechanisms. Flexibility and informality 
were also early features:12 commentators writing long before the enactment of the 
UK’s codifying Partnership Act 1890 noted that ‘no character or license is necessary; 
the bare consent of the parties being…sufficient’13 and that ‘nothing upon the subject 
7 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, 5-9 (New haven, Cy: yale University Press 1969). See also 
Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 257 (first published 1759, New york; Dover Publications 
Inc 2006).
8 Jonathan hardman, Reconceptualising Scottish Limited Partnerships, forthcoming in JCLS, doi:
10.1080/14735970.2020.1803784. 
9 William Watson, A Treatise of the Law of Partnership, xii and 55 (A Strahan and W Woodfall 
1794), Niel Gow, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Partnership, 2 (London; Charles hunter 1825), 
Erik PM Vermeulen, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States: Venture 
Capital, Joint Ventures and Partnership Structures, 6-7 and 105-110 (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer 
2003), Christopher Anglim, Joined in Common Enterprise: A Bibliography on the Origins of Early 
Anglo­American Partnership Law, 2-4 and 6 (William s hein 2005), John J McCusker ed., History of 
World Trade since 1450, Vol. 2 556-559 (Farmington hills, mI; Macmillan usa 2006).
10 Watson at n.9, Ch XII, Gow n.9, Ch IV, Anglim n.9, 2-3 and 9. 
11 Watson at n.9 and Sir Frederick Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, Ch IV (London; 
Macmillan 1882). 
12 Anglim at n.9, 6-8.
13 Gow at n.9, 4. 
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of partnership….requires explanation, but in what manner the profits are to be 
divided’.14 The Partnership Act continues to reflect and reinforce these features by 
being relatively brief and having been little revised. It facilitates the formation and 
operation of general partnerships which may be used to carry on any trade, occupa-
tion or profession,15 and provides flexibility (with minimal regulation of the internal 
structure or agreement), informality (including tax transparency, since partnerships 
themselves do not pay tax and profits are taxed only in the hand of the partners) and 
privacy (since little or no information need be publicly disclosed).16 Indeed, a general 
partnership is the default option for many businesses, because it can be created infor-
mally or even accidentally merely by satisfying the definition in section 1 of the 
Partnership Act (two or more persons carrying on business in common with a view 
of profit), and much more easily than corporate forms.17 A partnership also enables 
efficiency, because it is founded on mutual trust between partners, which is a cheaper 
and more effective method of monitoring the performance of co-partners than more 
formal mechanisms,18 the integration of management and ownership leads to indi-
vidual autonomy and adaptability,19 and participants are readily incentivised: if the 
firm does well, the partners automatically share in that success and if it does not, the 
firm has the advantage of being under no obligation to pay partners; the profit share 
of a particular partner can easily be increased or decreased to reflect his individual 
performance; and it is relatively easy to bring new partners into a partnership, which 
can incentivise employees (and also facilitate succession planning).20 
The rationale for limited partnerships (LPs) as opposed to general partnerships is 
that they can provide not only privacy, flexibility and tax transparency,21 but also 
limited liability to some (though, importantly, not all) owners, in return for greater 
disclosure through registration of (minimal) details about the partnership.22 LPs, 
which are governed by the Partnership Act as amended by the Limited Partnerships 
Act 1907 (LPA 1907), have increased markedly in popularity in the UK since 1987 
when hM Revenue & Customs (hMRC) confirmed that an LP used as a venture 
capital investment fund would be treated as a partnership for tax purposes and thus 
14 William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, 103 (first published 1785: 
Cambridge; CUP 2013). 
15 Partnership Act 1890, s.45. 
16 office of Tax Simplification (oTS), Review of Partnerships: Interim Report, paras F8 and F12 
(January 2014), Barr at n.3. 
17 Vermeulen at n.9, 14-17. 
18 Vermeulen at n.9, 205-207.
19 Vermeulen at n.9, 205.
20 oTS at n.16, paras F9-F10. 
21 Law Society of Scotland, Consultation Response – Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited 
Partnership Law, response to Q4 (July 2018).
22 Anglim at n.9 15-18, Pollock n.10 Ch IV, Vermeulen at n.9 105 and 110-111.
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not taxed directly.23 They continue to be used widely in the private equity industry24 
(as are limited liability partnerships (LLPs))25 as well as by family businesses (due to 
their flexibility and tax transparency),26 for tax planning (in particular to generate 
trading losses which can be set against other profits),27 and in property development, 
farming, film production and the oil and gas industry.28 As the office of Tax Simpli-
fication (oTS) has noted, the LP is ‘a vehicle that has been rediscovered of late’.29
The rationale for LLPs which, despite the partnership nomenclature, are corporate 
bodies, governed by the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 (LLP Act) and a 
number of statutory instruments, is to offer a combination of partnerships’ advanta-
geous flexibility and tax transparency with companies’ advantageous separate legal 
personality and limited liability for all members,30 albeit in return for the registration 
of considerable information about the firm, including its accounts (though not its 
internal agreement). There are, however, many parallels between LPs and LLPs; the 
oTS has noted that:
[b]oth LPs and LLPs have become widely used in investment arrangements…. 
The driver is a combination of flexibility, simplicity and allowing limited liabil-
ity status where needed….one point that struck us was how international these 
arrangements are and how the UK’s partnership laws have undoubtedly facili-
tated the growth of this useful component of the ‘City’s’ offering in what is a 
very competitive marketplace.31
A more recent rationale for all three partnership vehicles has been their ability to 
enable direct corporate participation,32 for which BEIS noted there is a considerable 
demand.33 There are no restrictions on partnerships (including LLPs) having corporate 
partners, or any requirement to have a non-corporate partner. This makes them more 
attractive than companies, which have since 2008 been required to have at least one 
non-corporate director34 and been under threat of being prohibited from having any 
23 BVCA Statement Approved by the Inland Revenue and the Department of Trade and Industry on 
the Use of Limited Partnerships as Venture Capital Investment Funds (26 May 1987) and Memorandum 
of Understanding between the BVCA and Inland Revenue on the Income Tax Treatment of Venture 
Capital and Private Equity Limited Partnerships and Carried Interest (25 July 2003). 
24 Elspeth Berry, Limited Partnership Law and Private Equity: An Instance of Legislative Capture? 
19(1) JCLS 105, 108-113 (2018). 
25 oTS at n.16, para. F12. 
26 Arabella Saker and Corinne Staves, Capital Gains Tax and Partnerships 1 PCB 29, 31 (2010) 
and Peter hargreaves, Trusts and Family Partnerships – Planning in the New Age (2008) 4 PCB 244. 
27 R (de Silva) v. Commissioners for HMRC [2016] EWCA Civ 40, [2016] STC 1333.
28 BEIS, Review of Limited Partnership Law – A Call for Evidence, n.4, 7.
29 oTS at n.16, para. F12. 
30 Explanatory Notes to the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000. 
31 oTS at n.16, para. F12. 
32 Barr at n.3. 
33 BEIS, Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law n.4, para. 47, Stephen M 
Bainbridge, Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom 59 Wm & Mary L Rev online 65, 71-75 (2018).
34 Companies Act 2006, s.155. 
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corporate directors.35 That threat, and the comparative advantage of LPs and LLPs, 
has receded; the government is now proposing that companies will be allowed to have 
corporate directors, the only restriction being that those corporates themselves can 
only have natural persons as directors.36 The government is also considering applying 
this restriction to corporate general partners of LPs and to corporate designated mem-
bers (essentially compliance officers37) of LLPs,38 although not to general partner-
ships, general partners of LPs or, more significantly, LLP members other than 
designated members. Since LLPs are only required to have a minimum of two des-
ignated members,39 this would allow the majority of LLP members in most firms to 
evade the restriction. 
Before discussing the vulnerabilities of the partnership vehicle to abuse, it should 
be noted that nothing in its history indicates that its rationale included the avoidance 
of legal obligations: indeed by the 19th century it was ‘well established, that no part-
nership can be contracted, except it have relation to fair trade or commerce, or some 
other thing that is honest and lawful’40 and, as Jonathan hardman also notes, illegal-
ity automatically dissolves a general or limited partnership.41 The problem now is that 
although many partnerships continue the tradition of shared enterprise in a trade or 
profession, the growth in the use of partnerships as investment vehicles, and financial 
conduits in many of the abuse scenarios, has led to the exploitation of laws not 
designed for these purposes.
3. The Vulnerabilities of the Partnership Vehicle
The most obvious feature of general partnerships and LPs which makes them vulner-
able to abuse is their privacy, which enables secrecy and anonymity. This is related 
to a second vulnerability of LPs and LLPs, limited liability. The laws governing busi-
ness organisations in the UK have traditionally reflected a balance between disclosure 
35 Companies Act 2006, s.156A, to be inserted by the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment 
Act 2015, s.87. 
36 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation on Implementing the Ban 
on Corporate Directors (9 December 2020), paras 22-26 (pp14-15; there are, in error, three sets of 
paragraphs numbered 25-26 in the document). 
37 John Whittaker and John Machell, The Law of Limited Liability Partnerships, para. 12.2 (London; 
Bloomsbury Professional 4th edn 2016). Designated members are subject to greater statutory obligations 
than those imposed on all LLP members.
38 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation on Implementing the Ban on 
Corporate Directors n.36, para. 26 (p17; there are, in error, three sets of paragraphs numbered 25-26 in 
the document). The proposal actually refers to ‘the general partners of an LLP [sic] and the designated 
members of an LLP’ but the first reference to an LLP must be an error and actually intended to refer 
to an LP.
39 LLP Act, s.8.
40 Gow at n.9, 6. 
41 Partnership Act, s.34; see further hardman n.8, section 4. 
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and liability; the courts,42 the Registrar of Companies,43 and BEIS44 have all empha-
sised the importance of disclosure by those who benefit from the privilege of trading 
with limited liability, and misuse of general partnerships is less likely because there 
is no automatic liability shield for any partners (although corporate partners can be 
utilised to achieve limited liability). Since all partners in a general partnership have 
unlimited personal liability to its creditors, it is only required to disclose partners’ 
names,45 whereas an LP can have some partners with limited liability and so must 
register its details at Companies house. however, since it must also have at least one 
general partner with personal liability,46 the registered information is minimal, 
whereas both LLPs and companies offer limited liability to all their members and so 
must register much more information, including their accounts and persons with sig-
nificant control (PSCs).47 
Unfortunately, the balance has now tipped too far in favour of limited liability and 
the facilitation of anonymity through opaque structures. Most general partnerships 
and LPs are exempt from the PSC regime;48 the Partnerships (Accounts) Regulations 
200849 (PAR 2008), which are supposed to ensure disclosure of partnership accounts 
where all partners are limited liability entities, are fatally flawed; and the financial 
services industry50 for whom secrecy is a key requirement,51 has ensured that even 
the minimal disclosure requirements for LPs are reduced for the two LP variants 
available only to that industry – private fund LPs (PFLPs)52 and partnership schemes.53 
This is despite the fact that ‘secrecy laws ….enable tax evasion [and] are also condu-
cive to laundering the proceeds of crime and creating a criminogenic environment in 
42 For example, Sebry v. Companies House [2015] EWhC 115 (QB), [2015] BCC 236 [51], Camera 
di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricultura di Lecce v. Manni C-398/15, EU:C:2017:19, para. 
49.
43 Sebry at n.22, [51]. 
44 BEIS, Article 30 of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive(4MLD) – Impact Assessment, paras 
33-35 (21 June 2017).
45 Companies Act 2006, ss1200-1204. 
46 LPA 1907, s.4(2).
47 CA 2006, Pts 15 and 21A, Limited Liability Partnerships (Application of Companies Act 2006) 
Regulations 2009, SI 2009/1804 (LLP Regulations 2009), Limited Liability Partnerships (Accounts 
and Audit) (Application of Companies Act 2006) Regulations 2009, SI 2008/2011 (LLP Accounts 
Regulations). 
48 Scottish Partnerships (Register of People with Significant Control) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/694 
(Scottish Partnerships PSC Regulations).
49 SI 2008/569.
50 BEIS, Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law, n.4, paras 40-44.
51 Berry, Limited Partnership Law and Private Equity, n.24, 123-125, D Walker, Guidelines for 
Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity, 17-18 (November 2007). 
52 Limited Partnerships (Private Fund Limited Partnerships) order 2017, SI 2017/514.
53 Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (Contractual Scheme) Regulations, SI 2013/1388. 
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which financial crime thrives’.54 The IMF55 and the UK government56 have high-
lighted reduced disclosure requirements compared to companies or LLPs as a factor 
in the use of UK LPs for ML and tax evasion,57 and both the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF)58 and the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private 
Banking59 emphasise the need for partnership structures to be transparent. Meanwhile, 
limited liability enables ’owner shielding’60 of LLP members, limited partners (and 
indeed general partners if they operate as corporate entities as discussed below) from 
claims by the firm’s creditors, so that the creditors – and through them the wider 
community and economy – are disadvantaged.
A third vulnerability is that neither general partnerships nor LPs are currently sub-
ject to the ‘valuable regulatory tool’61 of the company investigations regime, although 
LLPs are,62 and BEIS is considering extending it to LPs.63 BEIS (on behalf of the 
Secretary of State) has the power to appoint inspectors to investigate and report on 
the affairs of a company/LLP if, inter alia, it has been formed or operated for any 
fraudulent or unlawful purpose, or the persons concerned with its formation or man-
agement have been found guilty of fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct towards 
it or its members.64 An investigation may result in its winding up in the public inter-
est, disqualification of its directors or LLP members, or disclosure of the report to a 
prosecuting authority or regulatory body.65 Although Parliament has criticised the 
failure to use these powers sufficiently,66 there is little doubt that the absence of an 
54 Mary Alice young, Financial Transparency in Britain’s Secrecy Jurisdictions Has Just Got A 
Whole Lot Murkier Following the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU 31(11) JIBLR 583, 585 (2016).
55 IMF, United Kingdom: Financial Sector Assessment Program – Anti­Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) – Technical Note; IMF Country Report 16/165; 
June 2016, para. 49. 
56 hM Treasury and home office, National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing 2017, para. 9.22.
57 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 5; see also hM Government and UK Finance, Economic Crime Plan 
2019­22, 57, Action L4 (July 2019). 
58 FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
& Proliferation, 24, 89 and 122 (2012, updated June 2019), van der Does de Willebois and others, 
n.1 49.
59 (2012) at <https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/sites/default/files/wb/pdfs/wolfsberg-stan 
dards/10.%20Wolfsberg-Private-Banking-Prinicples-May-2012.pdf>. 
60 henry hansmann, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm 119 harv 
L Rev 1335 (2006).
61 Mark Stallworthy, Company Investigations and the Prosecution of Fraud in the United Kingdom: 
Conflicting Public Interests 8(4) ICCLR 115 (1997), IMF n.55, paras 49 and 56.
62 Companies Act 1985, Part XIV applied to LLPs by Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 
2001 (LLP Regulations 2001), SI 2001/1090, Sch. 2 Pt I.
63 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation n.5, paras 227-230 but not 
addressed in the UK government’s response (BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: 
Government Response n.5).
64 Companies Act 1985, ss431-432 and LLP Regulations 2001 n.62, Sch. 2, Pt I.
65 Companies Act 1985, s.441, Insolvency Act 1986, s.124A, LLP Regulations 2001 n.62, Sch. 3.
66 house of Commons BEIS Committee, Corporate Governance, para. 43 (4th Report of Session 
2016-17). 
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equivalent power to investigate partnerships makes partnerships more vulnerable to 
abuse than companies or LLPs.
A fourth vulnerability of both LPs and LLPs (and indeed companies) is the lack 
of verification of information by Companies house. Even if information is verified 
and found to be inaccurate, there is no sanction on LPs which fail to register the cor-
rect information on first registration, and the only sanction for failing to notify 
changes is a daily default fine on general partners of £1 per day.67 
A fifth vulnerability of LPs and LLPs is their possession of a certificate of registra-
tion or incorporation,68 and the option to have a so-called certificate of good standing. 
A certificate of registration or incorporation is stated to provide conclusive evidence 
that the firm came into existence on the date of registration or incorporation,69 and 
although Jonathan hardman argues compellingly that the certificate is evidence only 
of an LP’s existence at the date of registration, not of its continuing existence, this is 
not settled law and, in any event, it is unlikely that victims of wrongdoers will appre-
ciate the difference.70 An LLP, and seemingly an LP, can request to have a copy of 
the certificate endorsed with a statement that it has been in continuous existence since 
its initial registration and that no action has been taken to strike it off the register (a 
so-called statement of good standing),71 and there is evidence that these certificates 
are being used fraudulently as evidence of financial soundness even though Compa-
nies house is making no such judgment.72 In contrast, a general partnership is not 
registered and cannot readily prove its existence. however, this also makes it difficult 
to establish the extent of misuse of general partnerships, and there are certainly exam-
ples of such misuse on account of their secrecy.73
A sixth vulnerability of all forms of partnership is the lack of any prohibition on 
corporate partners or members, despite the fact that they can be used both to limit 
partner liability and to obscure the true ownership of the firm. BEIS suggested that 
over 95% of SLPs have no natural persons as partners,74 and TI-UK/belli¿ngcat noted 
that in one ML case, all but one of the 113 SLPs involved were controlled by corpo-
rate partners.75 
Finally, the vulnerability which has made LLPs and Scottish partnerships popular 
for criminal activities in recent years – with numbers of LP registrations up by almost 
250% in Scotland from 2010/11 to 2015/16, compared to under 50% in the rest of the 
67 LPA 1907, s.9. 
68 Scottish Property Federation, Review of Limited Partnership Law: Call For Evidence – Response 
Form, Question 2 <https://www.scottishpropertyfederation.org.uk/sites/default/files/resources/BEIS%20
Limited%20Partnerships.pdf>. 
69 LPA 1907, s.8C and the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, s.3(4). 
70 hardman at n.8, section 4.
71 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation, n.5, para 246.
72 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation, n.5, paras 247-248.
73 van der Does de Willebois and others, n.1, 49-51.
74 BEIS, Review of Limited Partnership Law – A Call for Evidence, n.4, 9.
75 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 7. 
ELSPETh BERRy216
UK76 – is their separate legal personality.77 This strengthens the ‘entity’ shielding of 
such firms from the personal creditors of LLP members and partners, with consequent 
adverse effects on those creditors and, as with owner shielding, the wider community 
and economy.78 Although Jonathan hardman argues that the legal personality of Scot-
tish partnerships arises by private bargaining, rather than as a gift from the State as 
in the case of LLPs,79 the resulting benefits to users are the same. Abuse of other UK 
partnerships is less likely because their lack of legal personality can complicate trans-
actions such as entering into contracts and owning property.80 however, there is 
evidence of such abuse,81 and their numbers have been increasing since the introduc-
tion of the PSC Register for Scottish partnerships.82 
This analysis indicates that any reforms need to apply to all types of partnership 
in order to ensure that vulnerabilities, and thus abuses, are reduced overall rather than 
merely displaced from one type of partnership or jurisdiction to another. 
4. The Abuses of the Partnership Vehicle 
The following abuses of partnerships are serious, and disadvantage not only third 
parties who deal with the partnership, but also suppliers to those third parties, the 
families of all involved, hMRC and taxpayers – and thus the UK economy, as well 
as the economies of countries where UK partnerships operate.83 
76 BEIS, Review of Limited Partnership Law – A Call for Evidence n.4, 8, hazel Gough, Four 
Reasons Why Scottish Limited Partnerships Need Further Reforms to Repair Their Tarnished Reputations 
(insider.co.uk 15 November 2017). 
77 Partnership Act 1890, s.4(2), Laura Macgregor, Partnerships and Legal Personality: Cautionary 
Tales from Scotland 1 JCLS 237 (2020), Paul Sutton, Scottish Limited Partnerships 916 Tax J 26 (2008), 
Stephen Chan, The Review of Scottish Limited Partnerships – And a Guide to What They Are (harper 
Macleod: hM Insights, 14 July 2017). 
78 hansmann, Kraakman and Squire, n.60 and Macgregor, n.77.
79 hardman at n.8, section 6.
80 The Law Commissions proposed separate personality for all partnerships (Law Commission and 
Scottish Law Commission, Partnership Law, para. 5.3 (Law Com No 283 and Scot Law Com No 192, 
2003).
81 The oCCRP’s data reveals that several English LPs were used in the infamous ML ‘Laundromats’ 
<https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/profiles/>, <https://www.occrp.org/en/azerbaijanilaundromat/
raw-data/>.
82 BEIS, Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law n.4, para. 57 and Limited 
Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law – The Government Response to the Consultation, 
n.4, para. 7, David Leask and Richard Smith, Boom in New English ‘Tax Haven’ Firms after Scottish 
Crackdown, The herald (Glasgow, 27 July 2018). 
83 hM Government and UK Finance n.57, paras 1.3-1.4 and 1.14-1.16 and BEIS, Corporate 
Transparency and Register Reform: Government Response, n.5, para. 9.
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a) Money Laundering
There is considerable evidence that SLPs and LLPs have been used to facilitate ML,84 
which compromises the integrity of financial institutions and markets, distorts the 
economy, and is an enabling activity for many other forms of organised crime.85 For 
example, a report by Danske Bank into the ML of funds from Russia and other ex-
USSR states through its branch in Estonia found that UK LPs and LLPs were the 
second most common type of non-resident client at the branch,86 and Transparency 
International UK/belli¿ngcat investigated a number of cases which demonstrated 
SLPs being ‘abused on an industrial scale, including for ML linked to high-end 
corruption’.87 The UK’s National Crime Agency estimates that hundreds of billions 
of pounds of corrupt funds could be laundered through the UK every year88 and, 
although this is not solely through partnerships, in comparison to other countries 
involved in a recent major ML scandal involving Danske Bank, one witness noted 
‘clearly the worst of all is the United Kingdom….the role of the United Kingdom is 
an absolute disgrace. Limited liability partnerships and Scottish limited partnerships 
have been abused for absolutely years’.89
b) Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Another abuse of UK partnership status, often related to ML,90 is tax evasion or avoid-
ance. Despite the common perception that such behaviour is focussed on ‘tax haven’ 
jurisdictions, it is actually the oECD countries, including the UK, that are most at 
fault.91 For example, it has been estimated that up to 95% of SLPs are merely tax 
evasion vehicles, including for criminal assets,92 and concerns about tax evasion by 
84 Maybe and Whewell, n.3, Barr, n.3, Gough, n.76. 
85 home office, Action Plan for Anti­Money Laundering and Counter­Terrorist Finance (2016), Liz 
Campbell, Dirty Cash (Money Talks): 4AMLD and the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 2 Crim 
LR 102, 102-103 (2018). 
86 Frances Schwartzkopff, Peter Levring and Alexander Weber, UK Shell Companies Forced Into 
Danske Laundromat Limelight (Bloomberg, 21 November 2018), Caroline Binham and George Parker, 
Danske Bank Scandal Spurs UK Crackdown on Limited Partnerships (Financial Times, 27 November 
2018).
87 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 6. 
88 National Crime Agency (NCA), National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 
2018, para. 102; see also hM Government and UK Finance, n.57, paras 1.2-1.3.
89 howard Wilkinson, former employee of Danske Bank and whistleblower, evidence to the 
European Parliament Special committee on Financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance (TAX3) 
at its public hearing on ‘Combatting Money-Laundering in the EU Banking system’ 21 November 
2018, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20181121-0915-
CoMMITTEE-TAX3>.
90 young n.54, 585, Peter Alldridge, What Went Wrong with Money Laundering Law?, 29 and 70 
(London; Palgrave Macmillan 2016).
91 Findley et al. n.1, 170, Nicholas Shaxson, The Finance Curse, 268 (London; Bodley head 2018), 
Tax Justice Network, Corporate Tax Haven Index 2019.
92 Roger Mullin MP hC Deb 5 September 2016, vol 614, col 131.
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partners have been raised by the Scottish government93 and charities94 as well as the 
media.95 Tax evasion is not only illegal, but it deprives the government of funding for 
public services, even though the tax evaders may have benefited substantially from 
those services. Partnerships are also used widely for tax avoidance, which is legal but 
contrary to the spirit of the law, similarly reduces public funds, and often crosses the 
line into evasion96 or is simply evasion which has not been detected because of inad-
equate public enforcement and well-resourced private advisers.97 As the EU Com-
mission noted: 
Tax evasion and avoidance deprive public budgets of billions of euros…[and] 
distort competition…..Innovation and competitiveness risk being stifled as 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which are the main source of 
employment in Europe, end up paying proportionately more taxes than larger 
companies that can afford to engage in aggressive tax planning. Tax avoidance 
can also increase the tax burden on labour, as governments compensate for the 
lost revenue by increasing taxes elsewhere. Fair taxation is…essential for the 
social contract between citizens and their governments.98 
Both the UK99 and the EU100 recognise tax evasion as a predicate offence for ML, and 
FATF has proposed that tax crimes be targeted by anti-ML (AML) legislation.101 
c) Other Criminal Activities
There is evidence that UK partnerships, particularly SLPs, have been used to facilitate 
bank fraud,102 unregulated money transfer systems,103 political bribery,104 the sharing 
93 Greig Cameron, Scotland Holds its Breath on SLPs (London, The Times, 29 March 2018). 
94 oxfam, Scottish Limited Partnerships – All Holyrood Parties Support Oxfam’s Campaign (10 
December 2016) at <https://oxfamapps.org/scotland/2016/12/10/2016-12-slp-campaign-success/>. 
95 David Leask and Richard Smith, Herald Research: Scots Tax Haven Firms Bypassing Transparency 
Laws (Glasgow, The herald, 11 September 2017). 
96 Richard Murphy, Time to Get Rid of the Scottish Limited Partnership, Tax Research UK (25 
August 2016), Lee hadnam, Tax Planning with LLP’s [sic], Wealth Protection Report (2018).
97 Shaxson, The Finance Curse, n.91, 240.
98 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on further 
measures to enhance transparency and the fight against tax evasion and avoidance’ (CoM(2016) 451 
final) 2.
99 Peter Alldridge and Ann Mumford, Tax Evasion and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 25 Legal 
Studies 353, 361 (2005), Jack Davies, Using the AML Framework for Enables of Tax Evasion: Some 
Practical Considerations 37(12) Comp Law 372 (2016), 372.
100 Directive 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of ML 
or terrorist financing (2015) oJ L141/73 (4MLD), Recital 14 of the Preamble. 
101 FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
& Proliferation, n.58, 32 and 113-114.
102 Gough, n.76. 
103 David Leask, Unregulated Web Cash Transfer Systems Using Edinburgh Shell Companies As 
Fronts (The herald, 14 November 2016). 
104 Barr, n.3. 
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of child pornography online,105 unregulated financial gambling,106 digital bootlegging,107 
and major corruption in the former USSR including in relation to the arms trade108 
(with over 40% of the beneficial owners of SLPs being either nationals of a former 
Soviet country or companies incorporated there, as compared to only 0.1% of limited 
companies109). In Moldova, UK LPs and LLPs were used as part of complex financial 
structures to commit fraud involving in the theft of one-eighth of Moldova’s annual 
GDP.110 In the Ukraine, a UK LLP was implicated in moving ‘billions’ as part of the 
alleged theft of US $5.5 billion from one of the country’s major banks.111 
5. Regulatory Solutions
Attempts to combat the abuse of partnerships have largely focussed on regulation, 
which has been defined in a variety of ways112 but is used here to denote ‘use of the 
law to constrain and organise the activities of business’.113 It thus encompasses busi-
ness organisation regulation, financial regulation and criminal law. 
Businesses typically exhibit resistance to regulation;114 recent history demonstrates 
that even strong and sustained pressure for regulation is likely to result in acceptance 
of only limited regulation, with increased resistance to anything more extensive,115 
and legislative or regulatory capture.116 That said, regulation, and in particular the 
105 Kate Devlin, Crackdown on Tax Haven Firms after Herald Investigation, (Glasgow, The herald, 
16 November 2016), David Leask, Bid for Talks to Stop Gangsters Zero Tax Firms (Glasgow, The 
herald, 9 November 2016). 
106 Leask and Smith, Scam Financial Gambling Sites Are Fronted by Scots Shell Firms, n.3.
107 Leask, Bid for Talks to Stop Gangsters Zero Tax Firms, n.105. 
108 Devlin, n.105. 
109 Nienke Palstra and Sam Leon, In Pursuit of Hidden Owners Behind UK Companies (Global 
Witness, 6 February 2018).
110 Kroll, Project Tenor II Summary Report: Report Prepared for the National Bank of Moldova 15, 
22-23, 41, 43 and 53 <https://bnm.md/files/Kroll_%20Summary%20Report.pdf>, Moldovan Parliament, 
Report CA nr 80, 10-14 (14 November 2018), Ben Cowdock, Tackling the Abuse of Scottish Limited 
Partnership Needs a UK­Wide Money Laundering Reform (TI-UK, 3 May 2018), Carlos Alba and 
Jordan Ryan, British Firms ‘Linked To Dirty Money Used Against Putin’s Opponents’ (London, Sunday 
Times, 21 April 2019).
111 Graham Stack, Oligarchs Weaponized Cyprus Branch of Ukraine’s Largest Bank to Send $5.5 
Billion Abroad (oCCRP, 19 April 2019). 
112 For example, Michael Clarke, Regulation and Enforcement 1(4) Journal of Asset Protection and 
Financial Crime 337 (2007) uses the term ‘regulation’ for informal self-regulation by a business and 
‘enforcement’ for more formal regulation.
113 Bridget hutter, Compliance: Regulation and the Environment, 4 (Clarendon 1997). See also 
Laureen Snider, Towards a Political Economy of Reform, Regulation and Corporate Crime 9(1) Law 
& Policy 37, 38 (1987), hazel Croall, Combating Financial Crime: Regulatory Versus Crime Control 
Approaches 11(1) Journal of Financial Crime 45, 45 (2003). 
114 Snider, n.113, 41.
115 Snider, n.113, 41-42
116 Berry, Limited Partnership Law and Private Equity, n.24, Shaxson, The Finance Curse, n.91, 13 
and 66-68, Snider, n.113, 45-50 and 56. 
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relatively light touch of procedural regulation (and indeed ethical codes), is more 
likely to gain traction with the gatekeepers (professionals and other TCSPs), because 
of their training and reputation, than with the end users. however, the abuses clearly 
demonstrate that current regulation is inadequate, which reflects Fuller’s argument 
that the morality of duty only leads to the most basic levels of regulation to ensure an 
ordered society, and that the morality of aspiration is required for the higher standard 
of individuals and societal excellence to be achieved.117 
This section of the article analyses the inadequacies in the regulation of UK part-
nerships, and whether the government’s proposed reforms will make a significant 
difference, and suggests strategies to enable these regulatory responses to provide 
effective solutions to the problem of abuse.
a) Disclosure of Participant Identity
Many of the abuses stem from secrecy as to the identity of those operating or financ-
ing partnerships.118 
Some transparency as to the identity of partners/LLP members is provided by the 
business names legislation,119 and by the LPA 1907120 and the LLP legislation,121 but 
only where the partners/members are recognised as such by the firm, which is fre-
quently a matter of dispute.122 In any event, LP partners only disclose their names and 
it is not clear how often the applicable sanctions123 are invoked, and indeed whether 
the criminal offence is committed by the partners or only by the firm;124 if the latter, 
then the deterrent effect is likely to be much less. The government has proposed that 
individual LP partners should have to register the same information as LLP members 
(address, birth date and country of ordinary residence) and additionally their 
nationality,125 but there are no proposals to make corporate partners disclose the same 
information as corporate LLP members (registered office, registration number, the 
register on which it is entered and, if outside the EU,126 legal form and applicable 
law), even though the use of corporate partners obscures ownership and enables lim-
117 Fuller, n.7, 5-9 and Smith, n.7, 257.
118 hM Government and UK Finance, n.57, para. 7.1.
119 Companies Act 2006, ss1200-1204. 
120 LPA 1907, s.10. 
121 LLP Act, s.2(2)(e) and (2Z), Companies Act 2006, ss162-165 and ss1139-1142 applied to LLPs 
by the LLP Regulations 2009 n.47, Regs 18 and 75.
122 For example Tiffin v. Lester Alldridge LLP [2012] EWCA Civ 35, [2012] ICR 647, Elspeth 
Berry, When Is a Partner/LLP Member Not a Partner/LLP Member? The Interface with Employment 
and Worker Status 46(3) Ind LJ 309 (2017), 322-325. 
123 Companies Act 2006, ss1205-1206. 
124 Roderick I’Anson Banks (ed), Lindley & Banks on Partnership, para. 3-34 footnote 136 (London; 
Sweet & Maxwell 20th edn 2017). 
125 BEIS, Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law – The Government Response 
to the Consultation, n.4, paras 25 and 27. 
126 This may change as a result of post-Brexit negotiations on the extent to which the UK continues 
to treat EU countries differently to third countries.
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ited liability to be achieved. It is therefore difficult to trace potentially illegal networks 
by identifying the corporate partners on overseas company registers; one investigation 
found that it was impossible to ascertain where the corporate general partners of 19% 
of SLPs registered in 2016 were incorporated.127 The government has also proposed 
that general partners in LPs, and designated LLP members, will need to undergo 
identify verification.128 however, limiting verification to designated members would 
create a significant loophole since some or most LLP members could avoid identify 
verification, regardless of their role in setting up and/or managing the firm.
As to the identity of those who have influence or control over the business without 
formally being partners/members, all LLPs and some partnerships must state whether 
there is a PSC or relevant legal entity (RLE) (a legal person which would have been 
a PSC had it been an individual and which is itself subject to the PSC legislation129), 
and register the nature of their control, their name and address, and either their date 
of birth and nationality or their legal form, governing law and registration number.130 
Unfortunately, the PSC requirements are ineffective for a number of reasons. 
First, they only apply to LLPs (and companies)131 and ‘eligible’ Scottish partner-
ships.132 ‘Eligible’ partnerships include SLPs and ‘qualifying’ Scottish general part-
nerships, the latter defined (by reference to the same term in the PAR 2008) as 
partnerships whose general partners are all either limited companies, or unlimited 
companies/Scottish partnerships all of whose members/general partners are limited 
companies.133 Thus, although the extension of the PSC requirements to such partner-
ships resulted in a reduction of 80% in the numbers of SLPs being registered,134 this 
was associated with an increase in the number of English, Welsh and Northern Irish 
LPs,135 suggesting that the problem of opacity has not diminished but merely migrated 
to other vehicles. The application only to Scottish partnerships presumably reflects 
the government’s desire to do no more than strictly required by Article 30 of the EU’s 
127 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 12. 
128  BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation on Implementing the Ban 
on Corporate Directors n.36, paras 24 and 26 (para 26 on p17: there are, in error, three paragraphs 
numbered 26 in the document) and Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Government response, 
n.5, para. 17 note 2 (cf para. 70 which provides, presumably in error, that identity verification would 
apply to LLP members generally). 
129 Scottish Partnerships PSC Regulations n.48, Reg. 3(6) and (7), and s.790C as applied to LLPs 
by the LLP Regulations 2009 n.47, Reg. 31B.
130 LPA 1907, s.8A and Scottish Partnerships PSC Regulations n.48, Regs 5-6 and 17-18 and Sch. 
3; Companies Act 2006, ss12A, 790A, 790C-790K, 790M-790ZD and 790ZF-790ZG and Schs 1A and 
1B, as applied to LLPs by the LLP Regulations 2009 n.47, Regs 3A and 31A-31N.
131 The Limited Liability Partnerships (Register of People with Significant Control) Regulations 
2016, SI 2016/340 (LLP PSC Regulations).
132 The Scottish Partnerships PSC Regulations n.48, BEIS, Implementation of the Fourth Money 
Laundering Directive – Discussion paper on the Transposition of Article 30 (November 2016).
133 PAR 2008, Reg. 3.
134 UK government Press release, New Measures to Tackle International Money Laundering (10 
December 2018), BEIS, Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law, n.4, para. 53.
135 BEIS, Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law, n.4, para. 57. 
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Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive136 (4MLD), which applies beneficial own-
ership requirements to ‘corporate and other legal entities’ and presupposes (incor-
rectly) that the beneficial ownership of a business vehicle which is an aggregate rather 
than an entity will necessarily be clear. In fact, although a person exercising influence 
over a partner may themselves be a partner under section 1 of the Partnership Act and 
thus be disclosed (and incur liability) as such, this depends on the partnership recog-
nising them as a partner – and, as mentioned above, many partnership disputes involve 
exactly this issue. In any event, transposition of 4MLD does not explain the curious 
and complicated application of the PSC requirements to all SLPs but only to some 
Scottish general partnerships. 
Second, the PSC register is not verified and therefore does not reliably or compre-
hensively disclose all PSCs but is ‘simply a voluntary honesty box arrangement’;137 
just six people are responsible for monitoring the integrity not only of the whole PSC 
register but of the entire Companies house register.138 The house of Commons Euro-
pean Scrutiny Committee noted that there ‘remain outstanding questions about the 
manner in which the information on beneficial ownership of [businesses] registered 
in the UK is verified by Companies house and [hMRC], which manage these regis-
ters on behalf of the Government’.139 FATF has said that the UK should ‘improve the 
quality of information available on the PSC register to ensure that the information is 
accurate and up-to-date’,140 noting that information ‘is not verified for accuracy which 
limits its reliability’.141 The scale of genuine error alone is evident from a Companies 
house pilot which targeted 250 suspected non-compliant companies and resulted in 
70% of them correcting their PSC details.142 SLPs in particular have been noted as 
having ‘a particularly poor record. Four in five SLPs have not named a PSC’,143 and 
Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon noted that although the extension of the 
PSC requirements to some Scottish partnerships was ‘an important first step in pre-
venting their misuse…. there continue to be revelations of criminality being facilitated 
through SLPs. More needs to be done by the UK Government.’144 Thus the important 
task of verifying PSC compliance is devolved to journalists and the general public, 
136 Directive 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing (2015) oJ L141/73.
137 Richard Murphy of the Tax Justice Network quoted by TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2. 
138 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 20, Palstra and Leon n.109, Jonathan Fisher and Anita Clifford, 
Looking Ahead to 5MLD, F & C Law 3, 3-4 (June 2018).
139 12th Report of Session 2017-19 (hC 301-xii), para. 14.9. 
140 FATF, Anti­money Laundering and Counter­Terrorist Financing Measures – United Kingdom:
Mutual Evaluation Report, 246 (December 2018).
141 FATF, Anti­money Laundering and Counter­Terrorist Financing Measures, n.140, 3.
142 openownership and Global Witness, Learning the Lessons from the UK’s Public Beneficial 
Ownership Register, 3 and 9 (october 2017). 
143 Maybe and Whewell, n.3. 
144 Nicola Sturgeon, First Minister’s Question Time 22 March 2018 (SP oR cols 24-25). The 
Scotland Act 1998, s.9 and Sch. 5, Pt II, C1, provides that ‘[t]he creation, operation, regulation and 
dissolution of types of business association’ are matters reserved to the UK Parliament.
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and although this could be a useful supplement to Companies house data checking,145 
it cannot and should not be a substitute for it. The lack of verification also surely 
means that the UK is in breach of the requirement in Article 30 of 4MLD that its PSC 
register is ‘adequate, accurate and current’, and certainly (as the government itself 
recognises146) of the amendments to Article 30 in the EU’s Fifth Anti-Money Laun-
dering Directive147 (5MLD) which require governments to put in place mechanisms 
to ensure this. 
What is needed is for the government to develop a capability to identify and inves-
tigate suspicious activity revealed in the data in coordination with hMRC and Com-
panies house, by mandating and resourcing Companies house to verify beneficial 
ownership data148 and sanction non-compliance, close loopholes by making it more 
difficult to file statements saying there is no beneficial owner, and check up on cor-
porate PSCs since they can obscure the real controllers.149 It is true that Companies 
house is ‘a registrar, not a regulator’,150 but the registration requirements include PSC 
disclosure; and verification by Companies house itself is feasible, as evidenced by 
the integrity project conducted by it prior to the abolition of bearer shares (where 
shareholder names were not on a physical certificate, and so ownership was concealed 
and could be transferred without documentation). This involved Companies house 
checking data relating to 75,000 companies and 5,000 directors in order to identify 
1,300 companies as having bearer shares, and then working with them to ensure that 
the shares were removed;151 an equivalent project could have been – and still could 
be – adopted in relation to PSC information.152
In order to comply with 5MLD amendments obliging entities which conduct cus-
tomer due diligence to report discrepancies between the beneficial ownership data 
they find and that on the public register,153 the ML Regulations have been amended 
to require such entities to report discrepancies to Companies house.154 The govern-
ment has further proposed that Companies house be enabled to compare its data 
145 hM Treasury and home office n.56, para. 9.32, Lord henley, Evidence to the Treasury Com-
mittee inquiry into Economic Crime, 22 october 2018.
146 hM Treasury, Transposition of the Fifth Money Laundering Directive:Cconsultation, para. 8.6 
(April 2019).
147 Directive 2015/849 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (2015) oJ L141/73.
148 TI-UK and and bell¿ngcat n.2, Recommendation 2, Bond Anti-Corruption Group, Joint Response 
to the Financial Action Task Force’s Mutual Evaluation of the UK, Section 4 (December 2018), 
Campbell, n.85, 119.
149 Global Witness, The Companies We Keep, 26-31 (July 2018), Nybord & Rørdam, Newsletter 
– New Requirement Regarding Registration of Beneficial Owners, <https://nrlaw.dk/newsletter-new-
requirement-regarding-registration-of-beneficial-owners/?lang=en>.
150 hM Treasury and home office, n.56, para. 9.32. 
151 Companies house, Annual Report and Accounts 2015/16 (July 2016), 5. 
152 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 17.
153 4MLD, Art. 30(4) as amended by 5MLD, Art. 1(15)(b). 
154 ML Regulations 2017, Reg. 30A. 
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against data held by other bodies.155 It has also proposed that PSCs be subject to vol-
untary identity verification (albeit by the PSCs themselves rather than by the partners 
or LLP members), with a notification on the public register if a PSC is not verified.156 
This could deter false information and make the task of identification easier,157 but to 
a lesser extent than its initial proposals for mandatory verification with criminal sanc-
tions on defaulting PSCs.158 Further, the government has not confirmed what evidence 
will be required – for example, Denmark requires beneficial owners to submit a 
scanned copy of their passport or other national ID159 – and without sufficient addi-
tional resources Companies house will be unable to check the information supplied. 
In any event, these reforms do not address the problem of PSCs not being disclosed 
at all.
A third deficiency of the PSC regime is that investigations into illegal activities 
are made unnecessarily difficult and time consuming, or indeed impossible, because 
it is difficult to ascertain which records at Companies house refer to the same person 
if there are many people with the same or a similar name.160 What is needed is a 
mechanism to enable public users to easily identify how many businesses a partner/
member is associated with,161 and increase the speed at which potentially suspicious 
corporate networks can be identified. The government has proposed that certain indi-
viduals will have to have a single verified account to which their roles in multiple 
firms can be linked,162 but the proposals exclude limited partners and, as discussed 
above, are ambiguous as to whether they apply to all LLP members or merely desig-
nated members.
Finally, the test for significant control lacks clarity and is, in any event, set at too 
high a threshold to address the problem of secret beneficial control. A PSC is any 
individual who has the right to more than 25% of the surplus assets of a firm on wind-
ing up or of the voting rights, or has the right to appoint or remove a majority of its 
managers, or has the right to (or actually does) exercise significant influence over it 
or over the activities of a firm which is not a legal person and whose partners meet 
any of the preceding conditions.163 however, the 25% threshold is arbitrary, can be 
circumvented by dividing ownership into smaller elements,164 and is too high since 
much lower percentages can still be significant, especially in sectors with significant 
155 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation, n.5, paras 208-210 and 
Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Powers of the Registrar (December 2020), paras 11-24.
156 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Government Response, n.5, paras 119-122.
157 openownership and Global Witness, n.142, 9. 
158 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation, n.5, paras 83-91.
159 Global Witness, The Companies We Keep, n.149, 27.
160 openownership and Global Witness, n.142, 7.
161 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 12.
162 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Government Response, n.5, paras 13 and 
157-160. 
163 Scottish Partnerships PSC Regulations n.48, Reg. 3(4) and Sch. 1 Pt 1 and the Companies Act 
2006, Sch. 1A as applied by the LLP PSC Regulations, Sch. 1.
164 Campbell, n.85, 118-119. 
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corruption risks.165 Furthermore, it will not be clear in advance what percentage of 
assets a particular partner will receive; many partnership agreements provide for the 
priority repayment of partner capital with the surplus distributed in different propor-
tions.166 The voting rights threshold is also difficult to transpose to partnerships, as 
the decisionmaking structure is entirely different to the companies for which the PSC 
legislation was originally designed.167 
b) Disclosure of Accounts Where There Is Limited Liability
Although LLPs (and companies) must disclose their accounts to third parties (at 
Companies house),168 general partnerships and LPs are not normally required to do 
so. By way of exception, the PAR 2008, which implements an EU Directive,169 attempt 
to ensure that in circumstances in which all partners have limited their liability, the 
partnership accounts are disclosed. however, the PAR 2008 have a significant loop-
hole in the definition of the ‘qualifying’ partnerships to which they apply. As dis-
cussed above in the context of the PSC Regulations which use the same definition, 
these are partnerships whose general partners are all either limited companies, or 
unlimited companies/Scottish partnerships all of whose members/general partners are 
limited companies.170 The PAR 2008 thus only apply where partners achieve limited 
liability through use of limited companies, and not where they do so through LLPs. 
This loophole is illogical given that the liability shield offered by a UK LLP is simi-
lar to that offered by a UK limited company,171 and should be closed. however, 
although Brexit will enable the UK to unilaterally amend the PAR 2008, such an 
amendment is unlikely because the EU Commission acted on information from the 
UK government when specifying the UK limited liability entities covered by the 
Directive,172 and Brexit has been presented by the government as an opportunity for 
reduced regulation;173 ‘those who were driving the Brexit campaign are also those 
who would have the most to lose if the UK increased financial transparency in line 
165 openownership and Global Witness, n.142, 7. 
166 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Money Laundering Terrorist Financing and Transfer 
of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017; Information about People with Significant 
Control (Amendment) Regulations 2017; Scottish Partnerships (Register of People with Significant 
Control) Regulations 2017 hL 2017-19, 8-II, para. 4.
167 Partnership Act 1890, s.24(5). 
168 Companies Act 2006, s.441, applied to LLPs by the LLP Accounts Regulations n.47, Reg. 17. 
169 Directive 2013/34 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and 
related reports of certain type of undertakings [2018] oJ L182/18 (previously Directive 90/605 [1990] 
L317/60). 
170 PAR 2008, Reg. 3.
171 helen Parsonage and Daniel Faundez (osborne Clarke), Reform of UK Limited Partnership Law: 
Government Response to Consultation (Lexology, February 18 2019). 
172 Email to the author from the EU Commission (DG Financial Stability, Financial Services and 
Capital Markets Union Unit 3B – Accounting and Financial Reporting), 23 July 2015.
173 Government Response to the House of Lords European Committee Report, Brexit: The Future 
of Financial Regulation and Supervision, paras 26 and 30 and hL Deb 6 June 2018, vol 791, col 1340. 
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with the Fourth Directive to combat tax frauds and financial crimes….high profile 
voters who signed the Brexit support letter include offshore-tax planners working for 
the super-rich and the heads of dormant businesses’.174 
A second problem is that even when the PAR 2008 do apply, it is difficult for third 
parties to establish this fact. There is no mechanism for partnerships to state that the 
this is so, and they are not required to state the legal form of their partners or specify 
whether non-EU partners have limited liability under their governing law, which 
might enable third parties to determine whether the PAR 2008 apply.
Third, it is then equally difficult for third parties to locate the accounts, because 
there is no mechanism to attach the accounts to the records of an LP at Companies 
house, or for a qualifying general partnership to register in order to attach its accounts. 
Instead, partnership accounts are disclosed through the indirect and complicated 
mechanism of being appended to the accounts of a corporate partner filed at Compa-
nies house (or another EU domestic registry) or, if no partners are UK or other EU 
companies, being made available at the partnership’s principal place of business in 
the UK or, if it has no such place, at at least one partner’s principal place of business 
or head office in the UK or, in default of any of the above, at a nominated UK address.175 
The result is that a third party seeking to find a partnership’s accounts must be aware 
of and understand the PAR 2008 in the first place, establish that the status of the 
general partners is such that accounts must be disclosed and the location where the 
accounts should be disclosed, and then – if this location is not Companies house – 
contact or travel to that location and find the accounts. The solution is to require LPs 
to state on the register whether the PAR 2008 apply to them and, if so, where their 
accounts are disclosed and, if on a register, under what company name(s) and 
number(s). General partnerships to which the PAR 2008 apply should be required to 
register such statements in the same way as Scottish general partnerships to which 
the PSC legislation applies are required to register either their PSC details or a state-
ment that there is no PSC.176 The vast majority of general partnerships would not be 
affected since they have one or more individual partners, and both LPs and corporate 
partners are already familiar with the register so this extra requirement would not be 
burdensome, yet it would provide essential information for regulators and law enforce-
ment agencies. At the very least, general partnerships should be required to state on 
business documents and at their premises the fact that their accounts are disclosed 
and the location at which they are disclosed, similarly to the disclosure of business 
names discussed above. 
The final problem is that the obligation to disclose accounts is not enforced by 
Companies house. This may be because of under-resourcing, and the difficulties 
outlined above in assessing whether the obligation applies and whether it has been 
complied with. however, it may simply be that it has been overlooked, as partnership 
issues so often are. Certainly it has not been included in the government’s recent 
174 young, n.54, 585.
175 Regs 5, 6(2), and 6(3)(a)(i)-(iii).
176 Scottish Partnerships PSC Regulations n.48, Regs 9, 19 and 23.
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consultation proposing the introduction of a power for the Registrar of Companies to 
query financial information before it is published.177
c) Disclosure of Other Information
Beyond the identity and accounting information discussed above, the information 
which partnerships must disclose is minimal. Potentially most significant in the con-
text of the abuses is that on first registration LPs must supply the name and reference 
of the presenter,178 but although this could enable Companies house to track who is 
forming suspect LPs en masse, lack of resourcing means that it does not; and for LLPs 
this information is optional179 – which is somewhat odd, given that they are equally 
implicated in abuses. The government has also proposed that the obligation to file an 
annual confirmation that all registered information is correct be extended from LLPs 
and eligible Scottish partnerships (as defined above) to all UK LPs,180 and although 
LPs are already obliged to update changes at Companies house within 7 days,181 
annual monitoring might deter those wishing to use an LP for illegal activities since 
it requires regular and on-going regulatory engagement. 
d) Judicial Review of Registration
It is well established that Companies house is entitled to refuse to register a company 
formed for an illegal purpose,182 because statute explicitly prohibits a company from 
being formed for an unlawful purpose.183 If Companies house decides to register a 
company which has an unlawful purpose, it is also established that the Attorney Gen-
eral is entitled to seek judicial review of that decision, with a view to quashing the 
registration. Indeed, the requirement of ‘lawfulness’ is wider than merely not consti-
tuting a criminal offence or civil wrong.184 In R v Registrar of Companies ex parte 
Attorney General185 the Attorney General was successful in an application to quash 
the registration of a company, on the basis that the purpose of the company – to carry 
on the business of prostitution – was immoral and therefore illegal for being against 
public policy, even though it was not actually a criminal offence.
These same options – of refusal of, or challenge to, registration – must also apply 
to an LLP, since LLP incorporation is conditional on the members being associated 
177 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation on Improving the Quality 
and Value of Financial Information on the UK Companies Register (December 2020), paras 74-77.
178 Forms LP5, LP5(s) and LP7. 
179 Form LLP IN01. 
180 BEIS, Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law – The Government Response 
to the Consultation, n.4, para. 24.
181 LPA 1907, s.9. 
182 Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406, 439.
183 Companies Act 2006, s7(2).
184 I’Anson Banks, n.124, para. 8-04 and Whittaker and Machell, n.37, paras 2.11-2.12.
185 [1991] BCLC 476. 
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for carrying on a lawful business.186 These options may also to LPs. Lawfulness is 
not specified as a condition for registration, but a partnership cannot be formed on 
the basis of an illegal contract,187 and both LPs and general partnerships are dissolved 
automatically if the business which they carry on is unlawful (or if it is illegal for the 
particular partners to carry on that business).188 
however, in any event, these options are unlikely to provide a solution to the prob-
lem of abuse in more than an occasional case. First, the ability of either Companies 
house to refuse registration or the Attorney General to challenge it is likely to be 
hampered by lack of knowledge of the illegal activities, not least because neither LPs 
nor LLPs are required (or indeed able) to register their internal agreements, although 
LPs (but not PFLPs) are required to register the nature of the business.189 In contrast, 
in ex parte Attorney General the Attorney General was alerted to the illegality by the 
fact that the company had stated its (illegal) objects in its registration documents, as 
companies were then required to do. Although the government’s proposals to enable 
the Registrar to query information before a firm is registered, and to remove her obli-
gation to accept any application for registration that is validly submitted,190 are to be 
welcomed, it remains to be seen whether Companies house will be adequately 
resourced to allow it to conduct sufficient checks to ensure that queries are raised 
whenever the information submitted (or not submitted) warrants it. In any event, the 
illegality will not always be evident from that information. Second, only the Attorney 
General may institute judicial review proceedings; other potential applicants are 
bound by s8C(4) of the LPA and s3(4) of the LLP Act which provide that a certificate 
of registration is conclusive evidence of LP existence or LLP incorporation.191 Finally, 
many of the abuses have taken place outside the UK and the power of Companies 
house or the Attorney General to take action in these circumstances is uncertain,192 as 
Jonathan hardman has also discussed.193
e) Disqualification of Partners/LLP Members
The disqualification regime under the UK’s Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986 (CDDA 1986)) enables those deemed unfit to be concerned in the management 
of a business to be disqualified from so doing, and this applies not only to company 
186 LLP Act, s2.
187 I’Anson Banks, n.124, paras 8-01 and 29-12 and Mark Blackett-ord and Sarah haren, Partnership 
Law, paras 4.1-4.7 and 4.20 (London; Bloomsbury Professional 5th edn 2015).
188 Partnership Act 1890, s34, applied to LPs by the LPA, s7.
189 LPA, s8A(2).
190 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Government Response, n.5, para. 23.
191 Neither section binds the Crown (Bowman, n.182, 439-440).
192 Blackett-ord and haren, n.187, para. 4.4, Whittaker and Machell, n.37, para. 2.12, Chitty on 
Con tracts, paras 16-055-16-062 (London; Sweet and Maxwell 33rd edn 2019). See also Trans­Oil 
International SA v Savoy Trading LP and Melnykov [2020] EWhC 57 (Comm) on the obstacles to 
English courts assuming jurisdiction over foreign partners in UK partnerships.
193 hardman, n.8, section 5.
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directors but also to LLP members194 and to partners.195 however, this is of limited 
use in combatting the abuse of partnerships. First, the power to disqualify only arises 
where the firm is insolvent and indeed, in the case of partners it may be that the power 
is further limited to circumstances in which the firm is wound up.196 Second, the power 
to disqualify only enables disqualification as a company director and, at least in some 
circumstances, as an LLP member. It does not enable disqualification as a partner,197 
and although it enables LLP members to be disqualified from acting as LLP members, 
it is far from clear that it enables partners (or company directors) to be so disqualified.198 
f) AML Regulation
AML legislation extends far beyond tackling partnership abuses and a full discussion 
of it is beyond the scope of this article, but it is important to note its role in combating 
the abuses by both partners and their professional advisors. It has two key strands: 
criminalisation under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (PoCA) of anyone involved 
directly in ML199 – in other words, the money launderers;200 and criminalisation and 
regulation of certain professionals and financial institutions under PoCA and the 
Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the 
Payee) Regulations 2017201 (ML Regulations) – in other words, the money launder-
ettes which facilitate ML. The ML Regulations implement 4MLD and apply to, inter 
alia, financial institutions, accountants, tax advisers, lawyers and TCSPs. They impose 
regulatory requirements including carrying out risk assessments and due diligence 
and enquiring into beneficial ownership,202 and provide supervisory bodies with 
statutory investigation powers. The supervisory authorities for members of the pro-
fessions are generally their professional bodies; for TCSPs which are regulated per-
sons it is the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); and for all other TCSPs it is 
hMRC.203 Both the supervisors and the supervised must identify and assess the inter-
national and domestic risks of ML to which the latter are subject.204 
however, the AML legislation is defective in many respects. For example, the ML 
Regulations require only minimal due diligence in relation to ‘low risk’ business 
relationships or transactions,205 fail to explain how to assess risk, and refer to ‘high’ 
194 LLP Regulations 2001 n.62, Reg 4(2) and Sch 2, Pt II. 
195 The Insolvent Partnerships order 1994, SI 1994/2421, Art 16 and Sch 8. 
196 Elspeth Berry, A Weak Vessel? Why The Insolvency Regime for Partnerships and LLPs Is Failing 
to Protect the Salvage or Diminish the Number of Wrecks 6 NibleJ 116 (2018).
197 Re Verby Print for Advertising Ltd [1998] BCC 652 (Ch) 668. 
198 Berry, A Weak Vessel?, n.196, 116-117.
199 PoCA, ss327-333A and Sch. 9.
200 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Enforcement Model, 113 (Cambridge; 
CUP 2000).
201 SI 2017/692. 
202 ML Regulations, Regs 76-92.
203 ML Regulations, Reg. 7(1). 
204 ML Regulations, Regs 17-18.
205 Ben Cowdock, UK Rushes to Meet Deadline, But Do They Get Full Marks? (TI-UK, 7 July 2017).
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and ‘low’ risk without explaining these terms.206 They also fail to support hMRC’s 
need to obtain information to combat ML and tax evasion; in Wilsons Solicitors LLP 
v. Commissioners for HMRC207 an LLP TCSP was not required to provide data to 
hMRC because the records which it was required to keep under the ML Regulations 
were not sufficient to make it a data holder. It can also be difficult to prosecute cor-
porate bodies such as LLPs.208
Possible solutions include increasing the amount of information disclosed publicly 
by supervisors and introducing minimum standards for regulatory outcomes in order 
to provide greater uniformity across the AML regime.209 FATF has recommended 
that the UK ‘substantially’ increase the resources of its Financial Intelligence Unit 
(UKFIU) which analyses financial intelligence gathered from the suspicious activity 
reports (SARs) (which Part 7 of PoCA obliges anyone who suspects ML to submit 
to the National Crime Agency), and address both its low number of high end prosecu-
tions and its low number of convictions for failure to disclose ML which is inconsis-
tent with the UK’s considerable risk profile.210
A further defect in the AML regime is lack of action against TCSPs for failing to 
administer proper AML procedures,211 despite a key feature of the abuses being 
TCSPs selling UK partnerships to wrongdoers abroad with no regard to their use,212 
and TCSPs being responsible for over 75% of SLP registrations.213 The UK govern-
ment’s National Risk Assessment of ML in 2017 (NRA 2017) noted ‘negligent or 
complicit’ TCSPs facilitating ML, abuse of structures set up by them, and inconsist-
encies in TCSP supervision.214 hMRC, which is their default supervisory authority, 
has insufficient resources to properly enforce the legislation215 and offers none of the 
additional assistance offered by other regulators.216 The house of Lords expressed 
concerns about the additional strain placed by the ML Regulations on all regulators, 
but in particular hMRC which had faced reduced budgets and increased demands in 
recent years.217 other commentators note that hMRC ‘has a poor record on enforce-
ment against ML failings, providing little disincentive to TCSPs considering lucrative 
206 Campbell, n.85, 102-103. 
207 [2018] UKFTT 627 (TC). 
208 Ministry of Justice, Corporate Liability for Economic Crime: Call for Evidence (January 2017), 
TI-UK, Corporate Liability for Economic Crime: Submission from Transparency International UK 
(March 2017). 
209 Davies, n.99, 376. 
210 FATF, Anti­money Laundering and Counter­Terrorist Financing Measure,s n.140, 12 and 40.
211 Chan, n.77. 
212 Chan, n.77.
213 BEIS, Review of Limited Partnership Law – A Call for Evidence, n.4, 13. 
214 hM Treasury and home office, n.56, paras 9.28. See also Graham Stack and Guntars Veidemanis, 
Latvia Banks Fuel Scotland’s Shell Company ‘Factory’ Linked to Moldova Fraud (bne IntelliNews, 3 
July 2015) and Graham Stack, Mystery Latvian Linked to Scottish Shell Companies Denies Role in $1bn 
Moldova Bank Fraud (bne IntelliNews, 9 November 2015).
215 Maureen Sugden, Staff Shortages ‘Threaten Crackdown on Shell Firms (Glasgow, The herald, 
30 April 2018).
216 hM Treasury and home office, n.56, para. 1.27.
217 hL Deb 6 November 2017, vol 785, cols 1649-1650. 
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clients which are nonetheless suspicious and constitute a high money laundering 
risk.’218 
What is required, at very least, is a separate professional, regulatory body for 
TCSPs, together with a duty on TCSPs to arrange professional indemnity insurance 
and monitor training and management of the AML compliance framework, which 
would reduce the risk of non-compliance and ensure that TCSPs work at least to the 
same regulatory standards, and develop the same structures, as other professionals 
working in the area. This would also leave hMRC the space to concentrate on those 
entities that fail to achieve the standards of their professional bodies rather than using 
spot checks across the board. 
however, this alone is not enough. The NRA 2017 suggested that professionals, 
including lawyers and accountants, pose equal – and in the case of accountants, 
greater – risks of ML than other TCSPs, while the Solicitors Regulation Authority 
(SRA) has acknowledged that AML training ‘does not achieve its goal of helping 
lawyers to identify and prevent money laundering’,219 FATF has criticised the ‘sig-
nificant weaknesses’ in AML supervision and particularly the ‘significant deficien-
cies’ of the 22 legal and accountancy supervisors,220 and conflicts of interest result 
from the role of many of those supervisors in acting both as advocate and regulator.221 
Furthermore, the existence of 25 different supervisors in total has led to fragmenta-
tion and inconsistency222 and the regime is expensive for regulators.223 The burden on 
regulators may increase as Brexit devolves EU regulation to under-resourced domes-
tic regulators, and EU scrutiny (in particular, by a well-resourced European Parlia-
ment) of both legislation and the regulators to the UK parliament.224 It also seems 
likely that the UK will be excluded from EU-wide intelligence sharing through the 
Europol Information System (EIS),225 which has been described as ‘arguably one of 
the world’s most valuable assets when it comes to sharing information across borders 
to tackle crime [including] money laundering’.226 
The government has proposed that applications to register LPs will only be able 
to be submitted by presenters who can evidence registration with an AML supervisory 
218 Ben Cowdock, Tackling the Abuse of Scottish Limited Partnership Needs a UK­Wide Money 
Laundering Reform, n.110. 
219 SRA, Ethics Guidance: The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds 
(Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (2 March 2018).
220 FATF Anti­money Laundering and Counter­Terrorist Financing Measures, n.140, 2 and 123. See 
also hannah Gannagé-Stewart, In a Spin? 162/2 Solicitors Journal 22 (2019). 
221 Bond Anti-Corruption Group, n.148, Section 3.
222 Bond Anti-Corruption Group, n.148, Section 3.
223 Terence C halliday, Michael Levi and Peter Reuter, Global Surveillance of Dirty Money: Asses­
sing Assessments of Regimes to Control Money­Laundering and Combat the Financing of Terrorism, 
paras 111-116 (American Bar Foundation, 2014). 
224 hL Deb 6 June 2018, vol 791, cols 1342-1364. 
225 Andi hoxhaj, The UK’s Policy Response to Serious and Organised Crime after Brexit (2 
July 2020), <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/02/07/2020/uks-policy-response-serious-and-
organised-crime-after-brexit>. 
226 Aziz Rahman, Just a Thought… Taxation (23 May 2019) at 21. 
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authority or equivalent overseas supervisory authority.227 however, improved pre-
senter regulation will only be effective if resources are allocated to Companies house 
to monitor and enforce it.228 The government also proposes mandatory self-verifica-
tion of presenter identity and rejection of proposed incorporations or filing updates 
from non-verified persons,229 which would reduce the likelihood of abuse by dimin-
ishing anonymity. It would also assist Companies house in verifying other informa-
tion, because the presenter would be identifiable and contactable. however, 
Companies house should also be mandated (and resourced) to put in place systems 
to identify TCSPs who act in the formation of multiple LPs and to report them to 
hMRC,230 both in order to deter misuse and to provide useful data to hRMC. 
Ultimately, failings in AML oversight are symptomatic of a wider problem with 
financial regulation in the UK. Emphasis on the language of ‘compliance’ rather than 
‘crime’ undermines the moral role of the criminal law231 in relation to both AML and 
tax evasion, and legal professional privilege has been asserted to protect against 
investigations into wrongdoing, by enforcement agencies232 and journalists.233 Bank-
ing scandals and collapses in recent years indicate that the UK has ‘the worst record 
of any [country]’234 and a house of Lords Committee Report on Financial Regulation235 
was described by other members of the house as ‘dangerously’ kind to the regulators;236 
they noted that pursuing ‘market-friendly’ and internationally competitive financial 
service regulation inevitably results in ‘the least-regulated structure’ and ‘a race to 
the bottom’.237 Related to this is the unwillingness of the UK to act against Crown 
dependencies238 and British overseas territories.239 Again, Brexit may weaken 
attempts to combat abuses by enabling the UK to avoid EU attempts to combat secrecy 
227 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Government Response n.5, paras 19, 96 
and 103, and Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law – The Government Response 
to the Consultation n.4, para. 11.
228 Bond Anti-Corruption Group, n.148, Section 4, Law Society of Scotland, Consultation Response, 
n.21, response to Q2.
229 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Government Response, n.5, paras 126-129.
230 Law Society of Scotland, Call for Evidence Response – BEIS Call for Evidence: Review of 
Limited Partnership Law, 12 (March 2017).
231 Croall, n.113, 46.
232 Rebecca Mitchell and Michael Stockdale, Legal Professional Privilege in Corporate Criminal 
Investigations: Challenges and Solutions in the Modern Age 82(4) JCL 321(2018).
233 BBC, Appleby, Guardian News and Media Limited and the BBC Settle Paradise Papers Dispute 
(4 May 2018) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/statements/appleby-paradise-papers>.
234 Lord Davies of Stamford, hL Deb 6 June 2018, vol 791, col 1356. 
235 European Union Committee, Brexit: The Future of Financial Regulation and Supervision, hL 
2017-19, 66-XI.
236 Lord Davies of Stamford, hL Deb 6 June 2018, vol 791, col 1355. 
237 Baroness Kramer, hL Deb 6 June 2018, vol 791, cols 1360-1361.
238 Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man.
239 Rob Byrne, Can MPs Force Laws on the Crown Dependencies? BBC (3 April 2019), <https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-guernsey-47525455, Mark D’Arcy/BBC>, Tax Haven Retreat 
Underlines Weakness in Commons (BBCnews, 4 March 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
parliaments-47445153>, Carey olsen, Bermuda’s Beneficial Ownership Registers and Privacy: Status 
Update and Further Observations (Carey olsen International Law office, 2 May 2019).
PARTNERShIP LAW: USED, MISUSED oR ABUSED? [2021] EBLR 233
in such jurisdictions,240 and of course the inaccuracy of the UK’s own register provides 
a counter argument to the introduction of registers elsewhere.241 
g) Anti­tax Avoidance and Evasion Regulation
As with AML legislation, anti-tax evasion and avoidance laws extend far beyond 
tackling the abuse of partnerships,242 and a full discussion of the detail is similarly 
beyond the scope of this article. however, as it is potentially an important part of the 
regulatory landscape, the reasons why it has not been successful in combating the 
partnership abuses need to be considered. 
First, to quote from a house of Commons briefing paper, UK tax law has histori-
cally been ‘specifically targeted rather than purposive’ with the result that as soon as 
the government acts against particular schemes, new schemes are invented to circum-
vent that law, which in turn results in further legislation, resulting in ‘an “arms race” 
between the revenue authorities and Parliamentary counsel on one side, and on the 
other, taxpayers aided and abetted by the legal profession’.243
Second, there is has been collusion between accountants and lawyers to enable 
clients to evade tax.244
Third, hMRC245 and professional bodies246 have been complacent that the existing 
AML regime was sufficient to cover negligent enablers of tax evasion, and although 
the UK has taken additional measures in recent years,247 including providing criminal 
and civil sanctions for enabling offshore tax evasion248 and making all types of part-
nership criminally liable if they fail to prevent their agents and employees facilitating 
tax evasion,249 tax avoidance and evasion remain significant problems.250 The General 
240 young, n.54, 585.
241 osborne Clarke, UK Companies House Gets Real about Corporate Transparency (osborne 
Clarke Insights, 15 May 2019).
242 Natalie Lee, Revenue Law: Principles and Practice, ch. 3 (London; Bloomsbury Professional 34th 
edn 2016), hMRC, Tackling Offshore Tax Evasion: Civil Sanctions for Enablers of Offshore Evasion, 
Annex A (July 2015), Aileen Barry, Evasion, Avoidance Or Mitigation? 19 Professional Adviser 18 
(July 2012), Prem Sikka, No Accounting for Tax Avoidance 86(3) The Political Quarterly 427 (2015) 
and Why Combatting Tax Avoidance Means Curbing Corporate Power: Shows How a Tax Avoidance 
Industry Has Facilitated the Corporate Capture of UK Policymaking 94(1) Criminal Justice Matters 
16 (2013).
243 Antony Seely, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper: Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion no 
7948 3 (11 March 2019).
244 Tanina Rostain and Milton C Regan Jr, Confidence Games: Lawyers, Accountants and the Tax 
Shelter Industry, 326-327 and 329-331 (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press 2014).
245 hMRC, Tackling Offshore Tax Evasion, n.242, para. 4.16. 
246 For example, ICAS, Response to the HMRC Consultations on Tackling Offshore Tax Evasion, 
para. 9 (october 2015). See also Davies, n.99, 373.
247 hM Treasury, Tackling Tax Avoidance, Evasion and Non­Compliance (November 2017)
248 Finance Act 2016, Part 10 and Schedule 20, and the Finance (No 2) Act 2017, Schedule 16.
249 Criminal Finances Act 2017, ss44-52.
250 Global Witness, Evidence Submitted to the Treasury Sub­Committee: Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion Inquiry (23 May 2018), <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/
evidencedocument/treasury-subcommittee/tax-avoidance-and-evasion/written/83331.html>.
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Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) applicable across the UK is based on the narrow test 
of ‘abuse’251 rather than the significantly wider test of ‘artificiality’ adopted for Scot-
land’s devolved taxes252 which allows Revenue Scotland to take action against tax 
avoidance arrangements which are considered to be artificial, even if they otherwise 
operate within the letter of the law.
Finally, there is the potentially adverse impact of Brexit, as much of impetus for 
tackling tax evasion and avoidance comes from the EU.253 When the UK leaves the 
EU, it may take advantage of the opportunity to weaken its anti-avoidance measures 
or at least to take no further steps to strengthen them.254 
h) Proposed Mandatory Link with the UK
A further regulatory method of combating abuse would be to ensure a link with the 
UK. Although the Partnership Act does not explicitly require that a general partner-
ship carry on business in the UK, it is unlikely that it would be recognised by a UK 
court if it had no activity there.255 however, neither an LP nor an LLP are required to 
have a substantive presence in the UK.256 An LLP need only have a registered office 
in one of the countries within the UK,257 and an LP need only have a proposed prin-
cipal place of business in the UK on first registration.258 While there is no law directly 
on the point, it seems that despite the assertion by Companies house that an LP can 
only move ‘anywhere in the UK’,259 an LP is not required to maintain its principal 
place of business in the UK after initial registration, or conduct any business there.260 
Thus the activities of UK registered partnerships can be removed from UK regulatory 
oversight as discussed above,261 making it more difficult for abuses to be identified, 
let alone combatted. Such partnerships are also unlikely to bring significant economic 
benefit to the UK.
The government has therefore proposed that every UK LP will be required to 
maintain a link with the UK by complying with one of three alternative requirements 
on a continuing basis: demonstrating that they have a principal place of business in 
251 Finance Act 2013, s.207(2)-(6) of the Finance Act 2013. 
252 Revenue Scotland and Tax Powers Act 2014 (RSTPA), Pt 5.
253 For example, Directive 2016/1164 (the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive) (2016) oJ L193/1, 
transposed by the UK by the Taxation (Internal and other Provisions) Act 2010 (TIoPA), Part 9A. 
See also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, n.98, 7.
254 young, n.54, 585-586.
255 Blackett-ord and haren, n.187, para. 1.15, Insolvency Act 1986, s221 as amended by Insolvent 
Partnerships order 1994, SI 1994/2421, Schs 3-6. 
256 Law Commissions, n.80, 260 footnote 26, Whittaker and Machell, n.37, para 2.12.
257 Companies Act 2006, s.86 as amended by the LLP Regulations 2009 n.47, Reg. 16.
258 LPA 1907, s.8A. 
259 Companies house, Guidance: Set Up and Run a Limited Partnership, <https://www.gov.uk/
guidance/set-up-and-run-a-limited-partnership>. 
260 Law Commissions, n.80, para. 15.34, I’Anson Banks, n.124, 29-27, Elspeth Berry, Death by a 
Thousand Cuts of Storm in a Teacup? The Reform of Limited Partnership Law 6 JBL 578, 583 (2011). 
261 See n.181.
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the UK; carrying on a legitimate business at a UK address; or engaging the services 
of an agent that is registered with a UK AML supervisory body and which has agreed 
to provides its address as a service address for the LP.262 however, only the first two 
alternatives would guarantee a substantive business in the UK. LPs with no real con-
nection to the UK will still be able to register here, because the private equity indus-
try objected to a requirement of a permanent place of business in the UK.263 The 
effectiveness of this reform will also depend on enforcement by Companies house 
which is problematic because of lack of resources, and indeed only the third alterna-
tive is readily susceptible of proof. A further problem is that these proposals do not 
apply to LLPs (or indeed companies) and may thus lead to a migration rather than a 
reduction of the abuses. In addition, it is not clear whether this will apply to the private 
fund LP (PFLP) vehicle, as PFLPs have been exempted from many of the require-
ments of the LPA 1907264 and clearly the financial services industry which lobbied 
for the PFLP legislation would like an exemption from the latest proposed reforms.265 
There is also a strong case for an SLP to be required to have a continuing address 
in Scotland rather than merely the UK266 because it benefits from separate legal per-
sonality, whereas LPs registered elsewhere in the UK do not, and if Scottish partner-
ships can ‘move’ this will extend the availability of legal personality in a rather 
obscure way which could be open to misuse. The equivalent requirement should also 
be imposed on English, Welsh and Northern Irish LPs. on the basis of his argument 
that SLPs acquire separate personality by private ordering, and can lose it similarly, 
Jonathan hardman argues that if an SLP is offshored it loses its separate legal per-
sonality and therefore the associated benefits, but while this argument is attractive it 
is by no means certain.267
i) Proposed Strike Off Power 
At present there is no procedure to strike an LP off the register. This removes a poten-
tial sanction against wrongdoing LPs and enables LPs to obfuscate their existence. 
The government has rightly proposed that Companies house should have the same 
powers to strike dormant LPs off the register and to strike off an LP following a court 
order as it has for LLPs and companies.268 however, while its original proposal was 
262 BEIS, Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law – The Government Response 
to the Consultation, n.4, para. 16.
263 BEIS, Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law – The Government Response to 
the Consultation, n.4, para. 13, Stephen Robinson, The Limited Partnership ‘Crackdown’: More Heat 
and Light Than Substance? (Macfarlanes LLP, 28 November 2018).
264 Berry, Limited Partnership Law and Private Equity, n.24, 116-125. 
265 Stephen Robinson, UK Limited Partnership Law Reform: Flexibility on ‘UK Links’, But What 
Does It Mean for PFLPs? (Macfarlanes LLP, 10 December 2018). 
266 Law Society of Scotland, Call for Evidence Response, n.230, 12 cf. objections to this proposal 
by the Scottish Property Federation, n.68, Questions 13 and 14.
267 hardman, n.8, sections 5 and 6.
268 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Government Response, n.5, paras 284-
285 and Limited Partnerships: Reform of Limited Partnership Law – The Government Response to the 
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for a court order to be based on the public interest, either on grounds equivalent to 
those for LLPs and companies269 or limited to the commission of certain offences,270 
the current proposal merely says that ‘[f]urther work will be undertaken to explore 
the criteria which should be met’.271 It is submitted that, at very least, the narrowly 
defined public interest grounds for striking off companies and LLPs should be applied 
to LPs: i.e. that it is in the public interest to do so according to a report by the com-
panies inspectors (a regime which, as discussed above, BEIS is considering extending 
to LPs), or by the Financial Services and Markets Act inspectors (a ground which, 
curiously, is disapplied for LLPs), or by the Serious Fraud office.272 Better still, the 
public interest grounds should be extended for all types of registered business vehicle, 
to include registration without proper AML procedures being conducted, or the 
authorities believing the business is being used for criminal activities.273 Jonathan 
hardman has also suggested striking off for illegality, on the basis that this auto-
matically dissolves the partnership and the register should reflect this.274
If Companies house is given the power to strike off LPs, it should also be man-
dated to record the number of ‘strike offs’ for a particular TCSP, in order to use this 
as part of a risk assessment and risk profile for that TCSP. 
j) Banning Corporate Partners/LLP Members?
The proposed legislative ban on corporate directors275 was not been applied to corpo-
rate partners or LLP members, despite some parallels between them and company 
directors, and the inherent risk posed by any structure whose managers and owners 
are not responsible for its debts and obligations.276 The government did emphasise 
that ‘it is important that we do not allow the UK LLP to become an increasingly 
popular choice for those seeking opacity to facilitate illicit activity’ and proposed to 
review this position should compelling evidence of abuse emerge.277 however, this 
is not reassuring given that such evidence is already available (as discussed above), 
and given its assertion that ‘[p]artnerships without legal personality…do not involve 
the same risk of opacity of ownership and control’.278 The office of Tax Simplifica-
Consultation, n.4, pp14-15, hM Government and UK Finance, n.57, para. 7.14, and the Companies Act 
2006, ss1000-1001 (applied with modifications to LLPs by the LLP Regulations 2009 n.47, Reg 50).
269 Insolvency Act 1986, ss124(4)(b) and 124A, applied with modifications to LLPs by the LLP 
Regulations 2001 n.62, Sch. 3. 
270 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Consultation, n.5, paras 224-230.
271 BEIS, Corporate Transparency and Register Reform: Government Response, n.5, p65.
272 Insolvency Act 1986, s124A as applied and modified by the LLP Regulations 2001 n.62, Sch 3.
273 Chan, n.77. 
274 hardman, n.8, section 5.
275 Companies Act 2006, s.156A, to be inserted by the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment 
Act 2015, s.87.
276 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 20, Recommendation 3. 
277 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), Corporate Directors: Scope of Exceptions 
to the Prohibition of Corporate Directors, 21 (November 2014). 
278 BIS, n.277, 20. 
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tion (oTS) noted that corporate partners are important for some partnerships to save 
tax by applying corporate rather than income tax rates or accessing specific reliefs 
for companies and profit retention to facilitate working capital, or for business-spe-
cific reasons such as farming partnerships using a corporate member to hold land for 
continuity reasons.279 however, these are not sufficiently weighty reasons if the coun-
ter argument is the need to prevent ML and other crimes; and although the government 
is consulting on whether its latest proposals on corporate directors should be applied 
to LLPs and LPs, these proposals fall short of a ban, as discussed above. 
The earlier introduction of a requirement merely for companies to have at least one 
natural director280 triggered a significant increase in the number of SLPs being regis-
tered, as those looking to facilitate illicit activity migrated to SLPs.281 By 2016, 94% 
of SLPs were controlled by corporate partners, 71% by corporate partners based in 
secrecy jurisdictions, and only 5% had corporate general partners registered in the 
UK.282
6. Ethical Solutions
The failings of regulation283 – because of inherent complexity and frequent ambiguity,284 
because wrongdoing is often not identified until too late due to inadequate monitoring 
and over reliance on individual complaints,285 and for the more specific reasons dis-
cussed above – strongly suggests that ethics must play a greater role in supplementing 
partnership regulation.286 This dual approach reflects Fuller’s argument that there are 
separate moralities, of duty and aspiration; it allows for the minimal levels of regula-
tion required by the morality of duty in order to ensure an ordered society, but sup-
plements it with an ethical framework which implements the morality of aspiration 
in order to achieve personal and collective excellence.287 Ethics can enable a correct 
balance to be drawn between what is profitable and what may be good in other 
respects,288 particularly where there are loopholes in the law289 – as with the PAR 2008 
279 oTS, n.16, paras 3.3, 3.17, F.13 and F.14.
280 Companies Act 2006, s.155.
281 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 9. 
282 TI-UK and bell¿ngcat n.2, 9. 
283 Phil Rudolph, The Role and Limits of Ethics Legislation – The US Experience in Peter Whates 
(ed.), Business Ethics and the 21st Century Organization, 6-10 (London; British Standards Institution 
2006).
284 Robert W Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired Guns in Deborah L Rhode (ed.), Ethics in 
Practice: Lawyers’ Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation, 48 (oxford; oUP 2000), Blair and Barbiani, 
n.6, 29.
285 Clarke, n.112, 339, Rhode, Ethics in Practice in Rhode (ed.), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers’ Roles, 
Responsibilities, and Regulation, n.284, 15. 
286 Blair and Barbiani, n.6, 30.
287 Fuller, n.7, 5-9, Smith, n.7, 257.
288 Geoffrey Chandler, Towards a Responsible Capitalism in Whates, n.283, 222-228.
289 Daniel T ostas, The Ethics of Corporate Legal Strategy: A Response to Professor Mayer 48 Am 
Bus LJ 765, 767-768 (2011) and Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws: Examining the Ethical 
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– or where the law is underenforced290 – as with the PSC register. Although ethics do 
not obviate the need for regulation,291 implementing a comprehensive ethical frame-
work would resolve, or at least reduce, the tension between regulation and the desire 
of businesses and their participants to avoid it,292 and raise standards above the leg-
islative minimum. Inculcation of an ethical framework can ensure that businesses are 
willing to comply with the law,293 and this more persuasive and co-operative strategy 
can promote better relations between businesses and the enforcement agencies,294 and 
thus more effectively combat complex abuses where detection and enforcement are 
difficult and costly.295 
Ethical considerations arise in practice, both for professional advisors and the busi-
nesses they advise, not only where activities are criminal, but also where they distort 
the application of the law or social norms; for example aggressive tax avoidance 
which reduces the money available for public services and confers a competitive 
advantage on those who can afford specialist advice, avoidance of other laws such as 
those for employment protection, and facilitation of potentially criminal behaviour. 
Ensuring that businesses’ responsibilities include not only the economic and the legal 
but also the ethical can protect the interests of stakeholders other than managers and 
owners, in accordance with developing notions of business social responsibility and 
businesses as good citizens:296 the ‘upright’ partnership must go beyond ‘mere com-
pliance’ with the law because ‘laws … frequently reflect “minimums” … [which] 
may not be at a level or standard that is truly needed to protect various stakeholder 
Dimensions of Corporate Legal Strategy 46 Am Bus LJ 487, 514-515 (2009), R M Thomas, To What 
Extent Is It Possible to Legislate for Good Behaviour in Business (That Is, Create ‘Hard Law’). Or, 
to What Extent Should We Rely on Non­Binding Guidance, Principles, and Codes of Conduct (Known 
as ‘Soft Law’) to Encourage Good Behaviour in Business?, Business Ethics and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Cambridge-Gourlay-Trinity Lectures, 58 (Ethics International Press 2015).
290 ostas, Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws, n.289, 493-494, Don Mayer, Legal Loopholes, 
Business Ethics, and Corporate Legal Strategy: A Reply to Professor Ostas 48 Am Bus LJ 713, 722-
725 (2011). 
291 Peter Bloom, The Ethics of Neoliberalism: The Business of Making Capitalism Moral, 46 
(Routledge 2017). 
292 hutter, n.113, 5
293 Croall, n.113, 47 and 49, Tom R Tyler, Psychology and the Deterrence of Corporate Crime in 
Jennifer Arlen (ed.), Research Handbook on Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing, 12-13 and 
21-22 (Cheltenham; Elgar 2018).
294 Christopher hodges, Ethical Business Regulation: Understanding the Evidence, 7 (BIS 2016).
295 Croall, n.113 46, Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Self­Regulation, Meta­
regulation, and Regulatory Networks, 140, 147-150, in their Understanding Regulation: Theory Strategy 
and Practice (oxford; oUP 2nd ed 2011), hodges, Ethical Business Regulation, n.294, 3.
296 ostas, The Ethics of Corporate Legal Strategy, n.289, 766, Archie B Carroll, The Four Faces of 
Corporate Citizenship 100 Business and Society Review 1 (1998) and Corporate Social Responsibility: 
The Centrepieces of Competing and Complementary Frameworks 44(2) organizational Dynamics 87 
(2015), Jonathan herring, Legal Ethics, ch. 12 (oxford; oUP 2nd edn 2017), Blair and Barbiani, n.6, 
38-42, Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon, Corporations and Citizenship, ch. 2 (Cambridge; 
CUP 2000), Alyson Warhurst and Kevin Franklin, Beyond the Limitations of a Written Code of Ethics, 
31 in Whates, n.283.
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groups and….may lag behind ethical thinking’.297 Eliminating, or at least reducing, 
the desire of businesses and their advisors to avoid or exploit the regulatory system 
including the underpinning law would help to restore the legitimacy of that system 
as well as enhance certainty and fairness.298 Ethics could create ‘buy-in’ to respecting 
not only the letter of the law but also the spirit of transparency and honesty underly-
ing those laws,299 and research indicates that compliance is greater where the rules 
are regarded as being applied and enforced fairly.300 Further, studies have shown that 
sound business ethics are in the interests of the businesses themselves.301 ‘Ethically 
weak’ behaviour exposes a business to greater reputational and legal risk,302 and eth-
ics are essential for the long-term sustainable survival and profitability of any business 
because of their positive effects on employee motivation, retention and recruitment, 
and improved brand image leading to increased revenue.303 Even Milton Friedman 
qualified his statement that ‘the responsibility of business ‘is to make as much money 
as possible’ with the caveat ‘while conforming to their basic rules of society, both 
those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom’;304 and the ‘Ten Prin-
ciples’ of the voluntary UN Global Compact for business, which purport to reflect 
universally agreed business values including anti-corruption, have over 13,000 par-
ticipating businesses in over 160 countries.305 
A detailed account of the major ethical theories is beyond the scope of this article, 
and in the interests of brevity the following discussion draws substantially on the 
297 Carroll, The Four Faces of Corporate Citizenship, n.296, 4, Lynn Sharp Paine, Moral Thinking 
in Management, 59 and 65-66 in Rhode (ed.), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers’ Roles, Responsibilities, and 
Regulation, n.284. 
298 Lynn M LoPucki and Walter o Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy 49 Duke LJ 1405, 1482-
1483 (2000), hodges, Ethical Business Regulation, n.294, 4. 
299 Andrew Boon, The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and Wales 3 (oxford; hart 3rd 
edn 2014).
300 hodges Ethical Business Regulation, n.294, 4 and 8.
301 hodges Ethical Business Regulation, n.294, 6, Carroll, The Four Faces of Corporate Citizenship, 
n.296, 4, Paine, n.297, 59, Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten, Business Ethics, 49 (oxford; oUP 4th edn 
2015). 
302 Paine, n.297, 70, Linda Klebe Trevino, Laura Pincus hartman and Michael Brown, Moral Person 
and Moral Manager: How Executives Develop a Reputation for Ethical Leadership 42(4) Calif Manage 
Rev 128 (2000), Blair and Barbiani, n.6, 49, Manuela Weber, The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Company­Level Measurement Approach for CSR 26 European Management Journal 
247, 248-249 (2008), Elizabeth C Kurucz, Barry A Colbert and David Wheeler, The Business Case 
for Corporate Social Responsibility in Andrew, Dirk Matten, Abagail McWilliams, Jeremy Moon and 
Donald S Siegel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, 90-91 (oxford; oUP 
2008). 
303 Weber, n.302, 249-250, Kurucz et al, n.302, 88-89 and 91-92, Paine, n.297, 71.
304 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits New york Times 
Magazine 1221 (13 September 1970). 
305 <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles>, Warhust and Franklin, n.296, 
25-27, Janet Morrison, Business Ethics: New Challenges in a Globalized World (London; Palgrave 
Macmillan 2015), Crane and Matten, n.301, 522-524.
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summaries of the theories made by Parker and Evans,306 Rhode et al.,307 herring308 and 
Fryer.309 Somewhat problematically, given that partnerships are abused both by their 
own partners and by their external advisors, who are often themselves also working 
in partnerships, the literature on ethics treats lawyers as distinct and different from 
other businesses.310 This is despite the evolution of law firms from professionals to 
economic enterprises run on business principles311 in direct competition for business 
advisory work with accountants and a range of other TCSPs, and despite the fact that 
the laws regulating the formation and operation of partnerships apply equally to both.
Turning first to the lawyers, the ethics of corporate lawyers are important because 
they facilitate many of the economic activities in society.312 one ethical approach is 
to act as an adversarial advocate and be entirely partisan to the client,313 but this is 
inappropriate for corporate lawyers who are generally acting transactionally rather 
than adversarially and whose clients are not underprivileged victims.314 Another is to 
apply the ethics of society generally, either by activism for justice, using legal prac-
tice to effect change, or ‘caregiving’, focusing on relationships, including with the 
community;315 but again this is also inappropriate because it is liable to put the law-
yer’s commitment to justice or wider society above the interests of the corporate cli-
ent, which is likely to lead to the client taking its business elsewhere.316 The most 
appropriate ethical approach is responsible lawyering – acting as officer of the court 
(which is already a regulatory duty on English and Welsh solicitors that can override 
their duty to act in a client’s best interests in litigation317) and agent of the system of 
institutions and norms within which the client’s interests must be pursued,318 and thus 
in the public interest and independently of the client.319 otherwise, a corporate lawyer 
306 Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics, 217 (Cambridge; CUP 2007), Boon, 
n.299, 26-27.
307 Rhode (ed.), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers’ Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation, n.284.
308 herring, n.296, 12. 
309 Mick Fryer, Ethics Theory & Business Practice, 136-137 (Sage 2015).
310 Rob Atkinson, Connecting Business Ethics and Legal Ethics for the Common Good: Come, Let 
Us Reason Together 29 Iowa J Corp L 469, 477-483 (2004), June Pritchard, Acting Professionally: 
Some thing That Business Organisations and Individuals Both Desire? in Peter WF Davis (ed.), Current 
Issues in Business Ethics (London; Routledge 1997).
311 Tanina Rostain, Self­Regulatory Authority, Markets, and the Ideology of Professionalism in 
Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, 171 
(oxford; oUP 2010), Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates 33 
Fordham Urb LJ 119, 119-122 (2005).
312 Parker and Evans, n.306, 214.
313 Parker and Evans, n.306, 14-24 and 215-216, John C Coffee, Gatekeepers: The Professions and 
Corporate Governance, 197 (oxford; oUP 2006). 
314 Parker and Evans, n.306, 215 and 225-226, Rhode, Ethics in Practice, n.285, 9. 
315 Parker and Evans, n.306, 28-37.
316 Parker and Evans, n.306, 31.
317 Arthur JS Hall v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615, 686 and the SRA, A Guide to the Application 
of Principle 1 (25 November 2019) <https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/corporate-strategy/sub-strategies/
enforcement-practice/guide-application-principle-1/>.
318 Gordon, n.284, 44-45.
319 Parker and Evans, n.306, 24-27 and 226-231.
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may avoid asking questions which might give rise to ethical considerations or indeed 
consciously use the law to achieve unethical goals320 – behaviour which is present in 
many of the abuses. 
For all businesses, including lawyers and other professional advisors, social con-
tractarian ethics justify controls which are necessary to live with the advantages of 
society, so long as there is voluntary – usually tacit – acceptance of those controls.321 
Thus by establishing themselves under the law of a particular country, businesses 
voluntarily consent to a hypothetical agreement to pay taxes and comply with regula-
tion in return for benefiting from that country’s business services, such as registration 
and legal recognition and enforcement of business arrangements, and from its general 
benefits, such as communications infrastructure, an educated workforce and accumu-
lated scientific/technical/financial knowledge.322 Regulation alone mandates only 
minimum standards of business behaviour and not the higher standards which would 
reflect the social contract more fairly, and is too easily circumvented as the abuses 
demonstrate. 
More recently, the stakeholder theory has become the leading ethical business 
theory. It assumes that not only investors but other stakeholders have a legitimate 
claim on the firm’s behaviour.323 This is particularly relevant to the majority of part-
nerships which are not used purely as investment vehicles and in which, therefore, 
investors cannot be identified as a group separate from managers and workers. Stake-
holders include suppliers creditors, employees and partners/LLP members, as well as 
stakeholders in all of these, including their families. This theory requires full compli-
ance with tax regulation, criminal laws, and the transparency requirements which 
benefit suppliers and other creditors, but the extent to which it would raise standards 
beyond the legal minimum is unclear. Further, although the government itself could 
be considered to be a stakeholder as representative of the public interest,324 for exam-
ple in relation to maximising tax revenue, it is also a self-interested stakeholder in 
maximising its chances of being re-elected, which can lead to dependency on the 
financial and other support of businesses, a factor implicated in the weakness of 
regulation325 and likely to reduce the government’s effectiveness in pressurising busi-
ness to act more ethically. 
other major ethical approaches can be divided into rule-based, character-based, or 
consequentialist. A rule-based approach holds that certain actions are inherently good 
– or bad.326 For example, the Kantian approach argues that actions should be based 
320 Parker and Evans, n.306, 217.
321 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (oxford; oUP 1999), Fryer, n.309, Ch. 4, Richard Norman, The 
Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics, 191 (oxford; oUP 2nd edn 1998), Thomas Donaldson 
and Al Gini, Case Studies in Business Ethics, 8-9 (Upper Saddle River, NJ; Prentice-hall 4th edn 1996).
322 Fryer, n.309, 136-137.
323 Crane and Matten, n.301, 58-59.
324 Crane and Matten, n.301, 490-497.
325 See n.109.
326 Donaldson and Gini, n.321, 6-8.
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on a duty to act in accordance with a universal and rational morality,327 and would 
thus invalidate setting up a business to launder money or evade tax, even though the 
formation itself is lawful, since the motive is not compliance with a moral duty but 
personal preference.328 This approach is problematic because of the inherent difficul-
ties identifying and imposing a universal morality.
A character-based approach focuses on whether the attitude motivating the action 
is ethical.329 For example, virtue theory330 as espoused most notably by Aristotle331 
focuses on the good habits or ‘virtues’ which an ‘ethical’ person needs to have to 
flourish, for example justice or compassion. Such a person can be expected to act 
ethically. however, although professional conduct rules may inculcate these habits, 
and exclude from the profession those who do not practice them, they still depend on 
personality and the effectiveness of training; while in other businesses the ethical 
training and standards – if any – will depend on the role undertaken by the person in 
question. This approach also fails to reflect the fact that a business, and particularly 
a partnership,332 is not a single character but a collection of relationships between 
individuals who are thereby exposed to being ‘socialized into the [businesses’] norms, 
values and mores’,333 which often include wrongdoing.334 
A consequentialist approach determines whether conduct is ethical by examining 
its consequences.335 For example, utilitarianism focuses on achieving the greatest 
possible good for the greatest number of people.336 This would invalidate setting up 
or operating a business in a way which reduces tax revenue or causes other harms to 
the community or the economy generally,337 even if it maximises business perfor-
mance338 or investor value. In order to avoid the inherent difficulties of defining what 
is ‘good’ in a particular scenario, and unpredictability of the consequences,339 the 
approach of rule- (rather than act-) consequentialism seeks to define rules which in 
themselves will produce the best consequences overall, rather than necessarily in an 
individual case.340 of these three ethical approaches, this is the most likely to eliminate 
327 Tim Jankowiak, Immanuel Kant in Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <https://www.iep.utm.
edu/kantview/#h5>, Norman, n.321, ch. 6, Kara Tan Bhala, The Philosophical Foundations of Financial 
Ethics, 14-18 in Russo et al., n.6. 
328 Fryer, n.309, Ch. 3 
329 Paine, n.297, 61, Donaldson and Gini, n.321, 9-10.
330 Fryer, n.309, Ch. 5, Carroll, The Four Faces of Corporate Citizenship, n.296, 5, Bhala, n.327, 
21-24.
331 Norman, n.321, ch. 3.
332 Paine, n.297, 71-72.
333 Snider, n.113, 52.
334 Rostain and Regan, n.244, 326.
335 Paine, n.297, 61, Donaldson and Gini, n.321, 3-6.
336 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (first published 
1781: Kitchener, ont; Batoche Books 2000), John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (first published 1861, 
Kitchener, ont; Batoche Books 2001). See also Norman, n.321, Ch. 7, Bhala, n.327, 9-13. 
337 Paine, n.297, 62-66.
338 Norman, n.321, Ch. 6, Fryer, n.309, 81-83.
339 Tyler, n.293, 31-35.
340 herring, n.296, 12, Donaldson and Gini, n.321, 5, Bhala, n.327, 10-11. 
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abusive behaviour which results in the harms discussed above, but elements of all 
three approaches are needed, and indeed rule-consequentialism inherently includes a 
useful element of the rule-based approach.
So, what would an ethical framework based on the social contract, the legitimate 
interests of stakeholders, and the achievement of the best consequences, rules and 
attitudes, look like, and how can it be created? First, its effectiveness will depend on 
the clarity341 and flexibility of its drafting342 in providing both general values reflect-
ing the role of business as a good citizen343 and specific rules to implement these 
values,344 and in indicating how a balance between conflicting values or stakeholder 
demands should be resolved.345 Many of these values are already widely shared (such 
as honesty, integrity and fairness346) but can easily be suppressed as a result of pres-
sures on the business or the individuals within it, or socialization into acceptance of 
dubious practices. Thus, second, the guidelines must encourage businesses to reduce 
internal economic pressures on individuals within the business347 which might result 
in unethical or ethically dubious behaviour,348 in order to reduce the abuses which 
result from ‘tension between profit and professionalism’349 – the latter defined as 
including not only professional advisors in its widest sense as ‘the combination of all 
the qualities that are connected with trained and skilled people’.350 Third, they must 
also enable businesses to resist external competitive pressures which may otherwise 
result in anti-competitive and anti-social unethical practices,351 both because of the 
need to generate profits in a competitive market and because ‘[i]t is easy to fall into 
the trap of believing that because a practice is being done by many (bribes, kick-
backs…..) that it is an acceptable practice’.352 
Fourth, ethical guidelines need to facilitate the further development of ethics in 
order to encourage businesses to consider interests beyond their own to mitigate the 
risk of behaviour which unreasonably fails to respect the common good yet can appear 
341 Andreas Prindl, Ethics in Financial Markets in Whates, n.283, 156, Ethics & Compliance Initia-
tive, Code Construction and Content, <https://www.ethics.org/resources/free-toolkit/code-construction/>.
342 Crane and Matten, n.301, 190-199, Munro, n.353, 102-103, Justin o’Brien, Recruiting Ethics – 
Citigroup, Corporate Governance and the Institutionalization of Compliance in Whates, n.283, Ethics 




345 Legal Sector Affinity Group [comprising the AML supervisors for the legal sector], Anti­Money 
Laundering: Guidance for the Legal Sector, ch. 13 (March 2018).
346 Blair and Barbiani, n.6, 45-48, Ethics & Compliance Initiative, What are Common Code 
Provisions?, <https://www.ethics.org/resources/free-toolkit/code-provisions/>. 
347 Rostain, n.311, 173.
348 Rhode, Ethics in Practice, n.284, 19, Paine n.297, 67.
349 Rhode, Ethics in Practice, n.284, 16-17.
350 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary & Thesaurus (4th edn, CUP 2013).
351 Coffee, n.313, 195-196, Paine, n.297, 67, Donald C Langevoort, Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral 
Compliance in Arlen, n.293, 270.
352 Carroll, The Four Faces of Corporate Citizenship, n.296, 4, Snider, n.113, 52 Chambliss, n.311, 
147. 
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rational if only narrow self-interest is considered.353 In particular, many businesses, 
including professional advisors often ‘serve massive clients…which….provide a 
significant proportion of their income; self-interest, disguised as loyalty to client is 
likely to outweigh obligation to society’.354 
Fifth, professional ethics requirements must be aligned with these more generally 
applicable guidelines. Admittedly, like all businesses, professionals have multiple 
selves, including rational economic selves and moral selves,355 and professionals have 
been implicated in the abuses. however, a substantial proportion are likely to be more 
accepting of an ethical framework than end users, who are liable to be dominated by 
their economic selves and thus to ignore ethical considerations which might reduce 
their ability to profit from wrongdoing, and as gatekeepers they are ideally situated 
to deny access to the partnership vehicle to wrongdoers.356
Sixth, an ethical framework must support ethical conduct both by individuals and 
businesses, by enabling both personal (character-based) and collective responsibility, 
requiring moral engagement with357 and acceptance of358 its principles.359 All indi-
viduals involved in advising or operating a business must accept personal moral 
responsibility for the consequences of their individual actions,360 and the roles of 
leaders and managers are particularly important both in terms of their personal ethical 
qualities and their ability to implement ethical behaviour throughout the business.361 
however, the ethical framework must avoid focusing too much on individuals, since 
most professional advisors and other business persons work in organisations which 
typically diffuse knowledge of wrongdoing and responsibility for it, and either pres-
sure an individual to act against their personal (or professional) code or socialize them 
into changing their personal code.362 Each business must therefore also take ethical 
responsibility for its (collective) actions,363 and businesses’ morality generally must 
353 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 48-54 (New york; Columbia University Press 1993).
354 Richard Abel, Towards a Political Economy of Lawyers 117 Wis L Rev 1185 (1981).
355 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, 
ch. 2 (oxford; oUP 1992). 
356 Ayres and Braithwaite, n.355, 20-27, Coffee, n.313, 198-199 and 228-230. 
357 Crane and Matten, n.301, 219, Sandra B Rosenthal and Rogene A Buchholz, Rethinking Business 
Ethics: A Pragmatic Approach, 194 (oxford; oUP 2000).
358 Clarke, n.112, 340-341
359 hodges, Ethical Business Regulation, n.294, 6.
360 Rhode, Ethics in Practice, n.285, 19, Rogene A Buchholz and Sandra B Rosenthal, Integrating 
Ethics All the Way Through: The Issue of Moral Agency Reconsidered 66(2-3) J Bus Ethics 233, 234 
(2006), Snider, n.113, 53.
361 Ethics & Compliance Initiative, Building Companies Where Values and Ethical Conduct Matter, 
8-15 (october 2018), Crane and Matten, n.301, 218-219, Trevino et al., n.302, 156-15, Prindl, n.341, 
156-157, Blair and Barbiani, n.6, 34-35 and 48-49, Tyler, n.293, 30.
362 David J Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience in Rhode (ed.), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers’ 
Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation, 94, n.284, Crane and Matten, n.301, 195.
363 Buchholz and Rosenthal, n.360, 234-238, Christopher hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour: 
Integrating Theories of Regulation, Compliance and Ethics, 688-693 (oxford; hart 2015) and Ethical 
Business Regulation, n.290, 5-6.
PARTNERShIP LAW: USED, MISUSED oR ABUSED? [2021] EBLR 245
undergo a cultural change through continued adoption of external social standards364 
(equivalent to that throughout the 20th century which resulted in improvements in 
workplace safety, working time and pay) so that abuses are recognised as having 
socially harmful consequences and therefore being unethical whether or not they are 
also illegal. Equally, a collective obligation is consistent with the fact that all firms 
– even those without separate personality – have rights which they can assert,365 an 
internal agency structure which enables them to act, an external identity, and an 
organisational culture, all of which contribute to creating a basis for attributing ethi-
cal responsibility to a business.366 however, while it is important to ensure both per-
sonal and collective engagement, separate codes for each would be unwise as it would 
create duplication and complexity and might thereby reduce engagement.367 Although 
in both the individual and the collective context moral responsibility might appear 
too imprecise a concept, the same criticisms could be levelled at ‘fairness’ or ‘justice’, 
and both of these concepts have been accepted as being sufficiently clear to be 
justiciable,368 and can therefore all the more be accepted as part of an ethical frame-
work.369
As to how such a framework can be created, one option is to enshrine it in legisla-
tion, but this approach would suffer from many of the same problems as the regulatory 
legislation.370 An alternative is a comprehensive ethics code. Those which already 
exist apply incompletely to only some professions, some other businesses, and some 
business sectors;371 and they apply in varying ways. Even professions which are 
already subject to professional conduct rules, training and gatekeeping are implicated 
in the abuses,372 which indicates that those rules are ineffective in enabling them to 
resist becoming subservient to corporate interests;373 and non-traditional professions 
such as TCSPs do not even have professional conduct rules. The radical step of a 
364 Snider, n.113, 52 and 55-57, Chambliss, n.311, 138-141, Tyler, n.293, 30, Langevoort, n.351, 
270-271.
365 For example, partnerships can sue and be sued (Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, PD7, 
I’Anson Banks, n.124, para. 14.06. 
366 Crane and Matten, n.301, 47-48, Buchholz and Rosenthal, n.360, 236-237.
367 The SRA’s recent division of its regulatory Code of Conduct into two, one for individuals and 
one for firms (although its Principles (including honesty, integrity and upholding public trust) remain 
common to both), has led to criticisms that it duplicates the burden of compliance (helen Evans and 
Clare Dixon, The New SRA Standards and Regulations: Greater Freedom for Solicitors? (4 New Square 
Publications, 21 october 2019), Jessica Clay, Understanding the New SRA Principles and Code: The 
Long Read (Kingsley Napley, 24 october 2019).
368 For example, the human Rights Act 1998, Sch. 1, imposes the overriding obligation of a ‘fair’ 
trial, and the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132, rule 1.1, imposes the overriding objective of 
enabling the court to deal with cases ‘justly’.
369 Tyler, n.293, 29-30. 
370 Rudolph, n.283, 10-17.
371 Blair and Barbiani, n.6, 42-45.
372 Parker and Evans, n.306, 50, Abel, n.354, 1179-1187, Atkinson, n.310, 471, Chambliss, n.311, 
142-145. 
373 Rostain, n.311, 182 and 186. 
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generally applicable code is therefore required,374 enshrined in Companies house 
registration requirements, and in guidance accompanying regulatory legislation. It 
would also need to avoid the pitfalls which commonly cause codes to fail375 because 
they do not achieve the ethical culture in a business which would reduce misconduct;376 
it needs to be understood, believed in at a fundamental level,377 supported and rein-
forced378 by guidance, reminders and career-long training, for example from the rel-
evant trade or professional body,379 monitored, and enforced with penalties.380 
If there were to be a comprehensive ethical framework to which all businesses 
(including professional advisors) genuinely subscribed, to act responsibly and focus 
on what is good for society from social contractarian, stakeholder and utilitarian per-
spectives, including maximising tax revenue and minimising loopholes which allow 
the facilitation of ML and other criminal behaviour, the abuses could be reduced. 
however, to the extent that ethical inadequacies in the partnership ecosystem are 
addressed, the ethics of companies must also be addressed, in order to avoid migra-
tion rather than reduction of abuse. 
7. Conclusion
The ‘nuclear’ option to combat the abuses would be to ban LPs and LLPs entirely, 
and indeed banning SLPs was apparently mooted by the government at one point.381 
however, this has rightly not been pursued; despite the vulnerabilities of partnership 
structures, they each offer many advantages in a unique combination. They are all 
flexible, efficient in integrating management and ownership, collegiate, tax transpar-
ent and private (which, it must be emphasised, can be entirely justified where there 
is genuine personal liability); some offer limited liability and/or separate personality. 
Partnership reform, whether regulatory or ethical, must allow these valuable features 
to be retained to the extent that this is consistent with combating the abuses.382 
The government’s proposals are welcome as a starting point – but they are inad-
equate, not least because many of them do not apply equally to LPs in the whole of 
374 hodges, Ethical Business Regulation, n.294, 6.
375 Warhurst and Franklin, n.296. 
376 Crane and Matten, n.301, 216, Iain Munro, Codes of Ethics: Some Uses and Abuses in Peter WF 
Davies (ed), Current Issues in Business Ethics, 103 (Routledge 2016), Ethics & Compliance Initiative, 
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379 hodges, Ethical Business Regulation, n.294, 3, Ethics & Compliance Initiative, Measuring the 
Impact of Ethics and Compliance Programs, 8-13 (June 2018), Warhurst and Franklin, n.296, 31, 
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380 Thomas, n.289, 59, hodges, Ethical Business Regulation, n.294, 4, Langevoort, n.351, 274-276.
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Russian Money (Glasgow, The herald, 22 March 2018).
382 Derek Mackay, Scotland calls on UK Government to Reform SLPs (Scottish Legal News, 15 
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the UK or to LLPs. Although the BEIS consultation on LPs arose from concerns about 
LPs, particularly SLPs,383 LLPs have been implicated in many of the same activities384 
and it is unfortunate that the BEIS consultation and subsequent government proposals 
largely ignore them. The focus on SLPs has sometimes reduced scrutiny of other LPs 
– as evidenced by the PSC legislation – and of LLPs. As a result, those using SLPs 
for illegal purposes may simply migrate to other parts of the UK and those using LPs 
might simply convert to LLPs. In addition, law abiding partnerships of one type or 
in one jurisdiction will suffer a competitive disadvantage.385
The proposals are also inadequate in in their substance. It is not clear to what extent 
this inadequacy reflects a government deregulation agenda based on extensive lob-
bying by the financial services industry.386 That industry has been identified as facil-
itating ML,387 and Transparency International UK/belli¿ngcat suggested that PFLPs 
in particular ‘could present another type of UK legal entity vulnerable to abuse by 
money launderers’.388 yet, the failure to regulate UK partnerships risks reputational 
damage to the UK,389 as even the UK government itself has noted,390 and reputation 
is an important competitive factor internationally.391 The house of Lords has criticised 
the low standard of UK regulation and the laissez-faire Anglo-Saxon approach,392 and 
Transparency International UK/belli¿ngcat observed that ‘[o]ne of the key advertised 
benefits of SLPs is that they provide the veneer of respectability associated with a 
UK corporate entity, whilst allowing their financial activity to be based elsewhere. 
Allowing this kind of abuse, and on [this] scale…, could severely damage the cred-
ibility of UK legal entities abroad’.393 
383 BEIS, Review of Limited Partnership Law – A Call for Evidence, n.4, 3, 4 and 9. 
384 hM Treasury and home office, n.56, Box 9.B, hilary osborne and Caelainn Barr, UK 
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Further enhancing the regulatory regime to include greater and more widely appli-
cable transparency requirements would significantly reduce the abuses as discussed 
above, and the costs would be relatively small given that registered and regulated 
firms already supply information to Companies house and/or regulators, and all firms 
will already prepare much additional information for their own purposes. What is 
needed most urgently is for Companies house to be mandated and properly resourced 
to verify information submitted to it, and monitor and investigate where that informa-
tion is suggestive of suspicious activities or is not supplied at all. TCSPs must be 
properly regulated, including full AML monitoring, either by a new professional 
regulator or by hMRC with proper resourcing. Enforcement also needs to be more 
rigorous, which necessitates better training and resourcing of those responsible, 
including government agencies (Companies house and hMRC) and regulators.394 
All enforcement agencies must take a proactive rather than a reactive approach, 
and violations should be published to act as a deterrent and provide effective training 
by way of salutary examples.395 Legislative reform is also required; of the LP and 
LLP legislation (including to mandate a meaningful and enforceable link to the UK 
(and to Scotland in the case of SLPs)), of the PAR 2008, and of the AML legislation. 
Last, and by no means least, there must be a new ethical framework, including: 
1. The identification of ethical beliefs which are already widely shared;
2. The facilitation of the further development of ethics, including as they apply to 
market activity,396 in order to create a more widely applicable ethical framework;
3. Ensuring that existing professional and other ethical codes are aligned with the 
new framework;
4. Support for ethical conduct by both individuals and firms. 
This will improve compliance with existing regulation (including by closing loop-
holes in it), and raise standards above that regulatory minimum: ‘law has not been 
the primary cause of reforms which have occurred. At most, law reflects, and rather 
weakly at that, changes which ha[ve] already occurred on the ideological level….
Public opinion, indeed, regularly favors much stronger laws and sanctions on [busi-
ness] misbehavior than the state is able or willing to deliver’.397 
To borrow from a discussion on the nature and purpose of corporations,398 it must 
be asked ‘for whose benefit are partners supposed to act?’, and a conscious choice 
made between answering either ‘for partners alone, to advance their own financial 
interests’ or ‘for partners and the wider community’. This article advocates the latter, 
on the basis that a business ‘is not strictly private; it is tinged with a public purpose…
394 Rhode, Ethics in Practice, n.285, 20.
395 Rhode, Ethics in Practice, n.285, 15 and 18
396 Blair and Barbiani, n.6, 46.
397 Snider, n.113, 9.
398 William T Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation 14(2) Cardozo 
Law Rev 261, 264-265 (1992).
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[of] increasing the general welfare’399 and ‘should be organised and operated to serve 
the interests of society as a whole … the interests of [owners] deserve no greater 
weight in this social calculus than the interests of any other members of society.’400 
Ultimately, the purpose of government regulation and of a supplementary ethical 
framework is to achieve the benefits that businesses and their participants, acting in 
their own self-interest and shielding themselves,401 do not generate.402
399 Allen, n.398, 265.
400 henry hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 88 Geo LJ 
439, 441 (2001).
401 hansmann, Kraakman and Squire, n.60.
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